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The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) in the US and the 
Single European Sky Air Traffic Management (ATM) Research (SESAR) program in 
Europe are redefining ATM, allowing for transformative new concepts of operation that 
may radically re-allocate authority and responsibility between air and ground. There is a 
need for methods that can systematically incorporate innovative allocations of authority 
and responsibility in the design of novel concepts of operations to enable them to meet 
their specified performance and safety goals.   
This need translates to two objectives: 1) Create the methodology and tools for 
analysis of allocation of authority and responsibility in novel air traffic concepts of 
operation, and 2) Create the methodology and tools for synthesis of allocation of authority 
and responsibility in novel air traffic concepts of operation.  
This thesis first establishes concrete definitions of capability, authority and 
responsibility in the context of function allocations in the design of concepts of operations. 
Then, it addresses the first objective by proposing a computational modeling and 
simulation methodology to assess allocations of authority and responsibility with respect 
to the performance and safety goals of the concept of operations. Subsequently, it addresses 
the second objective by proposing a methodology based on network modeling and 
optimization to systematically synthesize allocations of authority under specified 
allocations of responsibility to meet performance and safety goals. The proposed 
methodologies are demonstrated on a case study designing of allocations of authority and 
responsibility in aircraft merging and spacing operations during arrival. 
The methodologies described and demonstrated in this thesis can be used by 
designers of concept of operations to both analyze and synthesize allocations of authority 
and responsibility. Further, the results of the case study can inform the design of similar 
concepts of operations.  
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CHAPTER 1 -  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) in the US and the 
Single European Sky Air Traffic Management (ATM) Research (SESAR) program in 
Europe are redefining ATM. Increasing reliance on software, the use of new technologies, 
and higher inter-connectivity and increased coupling among airborne, ground, and satellite 
systems will allow for transformative new concepts of operation that may radically re-
allocate authority and responsibility between air and ground. 
Historically, technological constraints drove the design of air traffic concepts of 
operation, including the allocation of authority and responsibility between agents. For 
example, the attributes of ground-based radar and voice radio communications strongly 
defined the role of the air traffic controller, what clearances or instructions s/he had the 
authority to issue, and when and to what purpose they should be given. Now, innovative 
concepts of operation are possible that may be based on constructs that are substantially 
different from current-day airways, flows and sectors.  For example, the concepts of free 
flight or distributed/decentralized decision making envision aircraft being allowed to 
determine their own trajectory, typically with commensurate authority for separation 
assurance and/or spacing within the traffic flow [1].  Other concepts envision a strong 
centralized role in determining trajectories, such as providing scheduled or required times 
of arrival at specific points or specifying an entire trajectory that is planned to be conflict 
free and to maximize throughput [2]. 
With technology no longer the constraining factor, the design of these innovative 
concepts, and specifically innovative allocations of authority and responsibility, should be 
driven by system-wide safety and performance requirements, and by agent-level concerns 
such as taskload and requirements for information transfer. These transformative concepts 
of operation can have significant impact on the agents themselves (e.g. their taskload), on 
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requirements for information transfer between agents (by whatever communication 
mechanisms), and potentially on system performance. For instance, new concepts of 
operation that allocate in-trail spacing functions to the flight deck may significantly reduce 
the task load of the air traffic controller (which may or may not be beneficial), while 
increasing both the task load assigned to aircraft agents (notably, the flight crew) and the 
requirement for information transfer between the controller and the aircraft about spacing. 
Ultimately, these measures tie into system-wide metrics such as the distribution of taskload 
and information transfer between agents, among others. 
However, current methods to design new concepts of operation rely heavily on 
subject matter experts (SMEs) who, in turn, rely on heuristics, experience, or rules of 
thumb. This process has several shortcomings.  First, if the concept of operations is truly 
innovative and transformative, the expertise of SMEs will not extrapolate well to its new 
characteristics and concerns.  Second, air traffic systems are complex by any measure, and 
thus need design processes with evaluation methods that scale to their scope and detail.  
Third, many of the interesting effects – and metrics – are emergent, i.e., they arise at a 
different level of abstraction than the behavior that creates them. Finally, testing methods 
typically rely on Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) simulations which, while being the 
appropriate final test before implementation, occur too late in the design cycle for easy 
testing of key issues that may require significant changes to the entire concept of operation 
or to supporting technologies. 
Thus, there is a need for methods that can systematically incorporate innovative 
allocations of authority and responsibility in the design of novel concepts of operations to 
enable the concepts of operations to meet their specified performance and safety goals. 
This thesis proposes methodologies comprising of computational modeling and simulation, 
and network science and optimization, to systematically analyze and synthesize the 




This thesis defines concept of operation as the specification of how an operation is 
to be carried out, framed from the viewpoint of the actors who will execute it. Within a 
concept of operations, this thesis defines an action as an activity that is executed at a single 
point(s) in time by a single agent. An air traffic concept of operation, by these definitions, 
identifies what actions will be carried out to create a desired outcome, and by whom; it is 
sufficiently specific to locate the conditions where each action needs to be carried out, and 
criteria for successful completion of each action.  
The design decision that determines which agent performs what action is called 
allocation. When allocating actions to agents, a concept of operation should 
unambiguously specify which agents have capability, authority and responsibility for 
which action. The capability of an agent to perform a particular action is defined here as 
the ability of that particular agent to perform that particular action. For example, “agent A 
has capability for action B” is interpreted as “agent A can perform action B”. In the more 
general sense, capability can be viewed as a knob instead of a switch, with different agents 
having varying degrees of capability for performing the same action, or the same agent 
having varying degrees of capability for different actions, or the same agent having varying 
degrees of capability for the same action with varying contexts (e.g. lack of information 
may render an agent incapable of performing an action). 
In this thesis, the agent assigned to perform a certain action is said to have been 
allocated authority for that particular action. This has been recognized in basic 
requirements for allocations of authority, notably that: (1) the allocation of authority be 
within each agent’s capability, i.e., each agent should be capable of each action it is given 
authority for; and (2) each agent should also be capable of the collective set of actions it is 
allocated, i.e., the set should reflect a reasonable task load at all times [3]. Particularly when 
examining allocations to human agents such as air traffic controllers and pilots, this 
taskload needs to fit within both upper limits representing saturation, and lower limits 
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representing boredom and lack of task engagement; further, the task load needs to fit within 
these limits not only in the aggregate, but also at all points in time to prevent concerns such 
as workload spikes.  Some machine agents may also have constraints, particularly when 
they are sensitive to real-time computing limits. 
This thesis defines responsibility as a designation that is typically a legal or policy 
matter that assigns accountability to an agent for an action’s outcome. An authority-
responsibility mismatch is created when the agent with responsibility for an action’s 
outcome does not have authority to (nominally) execute the action.  Such a mismatch may 
be purposefully created to enhance safety: it represents a redundancy that provides 
monitoring, oversight and error checking within the operation.  However, whether 
purposefully created or not, such mismatches also require more work by the agents with 
responsibility.  This added work is generally referred to as “monitoring work” throughout 
this thesis, although it may also demand intervening and (re-)doing the actions of others.  
This monitoring has several relevant attributes.  First, while such monitoring is targeted at 
rare situations where another agent fails, the time of these situations is not known a priori 
and thus the monitoring work needs to occur continuously (at least at some level).  Second, 
to be effective, the monitoring needs to have access to the same, or at least equivalent, 
information, often requiring significant information transfer between agents.  Third, such 
passive monitoring is not generally considered to be a strength of the human [3], and the 
decision to intervene may be difficult and often time-critical.  Thus, the monitoring work 
implicit in the relative assignments of authority and responsibility should be explicitly 
identified early in design. 
Capability, authority and responsibility (AA&R) can be viewed as a mapping from 
the set of agents to the set of actions. Figure 1.1 gives an example of allocating AA&R in 
a scenario involving 3 actions and 2 agents. Agent and action boxes having the same outline 
style (dashed or solid) represent capability. Thus, in the figure, agent 1 has capability for 
action 1 and agent 2 has capability for action 3. Action 2, on the other hand, has both dashed 
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and solid outlines to show that that both agents 1 and 2 have capability for action 2. Thus, 
in a potential concept of operations involving these actions and agents, agent 1 can be 
assigned authority for action 1 and agent 2 can be assigned authority for action 3. Further, 
either agent 1 or agent 2 could be assigned authority for action 2. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Allocation of capability, authority and responsibility. The solid arrows 
show the allocation of authority and dotted arrows show the allocation of 
responsibility 
 
The allocation of authority is represented by the solid arrows in the figure. Thus, 
agent 1 has authority for actions 1 and 2, which means that agent 1 will perform these 
actions in the concept of operations. Similarly, agent 2 has authority for action 3 which 
means that action 3 will be performed by agent 2 in the concept of operations.  
The allocation of responsibility is represented by the dotted arrows in the figure. 
Thus, agent 1 has responsibility for action 1 and agent 2 has responsibility for actions 2 
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and 3. Note that an authority-responsibility mismatch is created in the case of action 2 as 
agent 1 has authority for performing it but agent 2 has responsibility for its outcome. Thus, 
the legal implication of the outcome of action 2 falls on agent 2 which creates a requirement 
for agent 2 to monitor the performance of action 2. 
Finally, it should be noted that the allocation of authority and responsibility may be 
fixed or dynamic. Key examples of current-day dynamic allocation of actions to agents 
include the changes in pilots’ authority and responsibility inherent with the triggering of a 
Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Resolution Advisory, and the changes in both 
pilots’ authority and responsibility when they accept a clearance for a visual approach.  
Future aviation concepts of operations may dramatically increase the number of potential 
function allocations of authority and responsibility, and triggers for dynamic re-allocation. 
1.3 Objectives 
The goal of this thesis is to address the need for methods that can systematically 
incorporate innovative allocations of authority and responsibility in the design of novel 
concepts of operations to enable the concepts of operations to meet their specified 
performance and safety goals. This goal translates to the following two objectives: 
1. Create the methodology and tools for analysis of allocation of authority and 
responsibility in the design of novel air traffic concepts of operation; and 
2. Create the methodology and tools for synthesis of allocation of authority and 
responsibility in the design of novel air traffic concepts of operation.  
1.4 Overview of Thesis 
This thesis proposes methodologies comprising computational modeling and 
simulation, and network science, to systematically analyze and synthesize the allocation of 
authority and responsibility in the design of novel concepts of operation. Whereas 
computational modeling and simulation quantifies emergent metrics of the concept of 
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operation, thereby providing the capability to analyze the impact of allocation, the 
representation of the concept of operation as a network allows the application of network 
theoretic techniques to synthesize allocations to meet the desired performance and safety 
goals of the concept of operations. 
Chapter 2 provides a background on function allocation from two perspectives: 1) 
air-ground function allocation and 2) human-automation function allocation. A review of 
the requirements that any function allocation should satisfy, and the metrics for 
quantitatively evaluating function allocations, is also provided in this chapter.  
Chapter 3 and 4 describe methodologies for analysis and synthesis of allocations to 
meet the performance and safety goals of the concept of operations. Chapter 3 describes a 
methodology for analyzing function allocations using computational modeling and 
simulation to capture and quantify the emergent metrics of the concept of operations. 
Chapter 4 describes a methodology to synthesize function allocations by network modeling 
and subsequently network optimization to find clusters of authority and responsibility.  
While computer simulation identifies and quantifies the emergent properties of a concept 
of operation, the network representation provides a structure to identify and exploit 
inherent properties in the work underlying the concept. Taken together these two tools can 
work in tandem for the allocation of authority and responsibility with the computer 
simulation parametrizing the network representation and the network representation 
abstracting the emergence obtained from computer simulation. 
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the thesis, notes its contributions to allocation 
design for air traffic concepts of operations, and discusses potential future research and 





CHAPTER 2 -  BACKGROUND 
Function allocation is the design decision that defines which agents – human or 
automated and air or ground – have authority and responsibility to perform the actions 
required for the system to operate, and is a crucial factor in determining concepts of 
operation. This chapter reviews the function allocation literature from both the air-ground 
and the human-automation perspective. 
2.1 Air-Ground Function Allocation 
Separation assurance and spacing are key functions within ATM in which the 
problem of air-ground allocation has been examined. The primary separation assurance and 
spacing functions are: predict/detect the conflict, determine a trajectory modification to 
safely and efficiently resolve the conflict, and execute the trajectory modification [4]. To 
safely accommodate significantly higher traffic densities in the future, substantial changes 
are being proposed in the allocation of functions to air and ground. There is a large body 
of literature reporting investigations of such future concepts using computer based 
simulations, HITL simulations, and operational evaluations. 
The literature reporting concepts of operations for separation and spacing can be 
broadly categorized into the following categories: Air-Ground Separation Assurance and 
Spacing with Limited Delegation, Air-Ground Separation Assurance and Spacing with 
Mixed Air-Ground Separation Responsibility, Ground-Based Separation Assurance and 
Spacing, and Airborne Separation Assurance and Spacing. The following sub-sections 
summarize the research from these categories relevant to methods for function allocation.  
2.1.1 Separation Assurance and Spacing with Limited Delegation 
Among future configurations of air-ground function allocation, the most well 
studied has been shared air-ground control where the Air Navigation Service Provider 
(ANSP) delegates specific separation or spacing functions to the cockpit crew on a limited 
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(per-event) basis. The flight deck equipage generally consists of a Cockpit Display of 
Traffic Information (CDTI) with an ADS-B data feed of local traffic. An HITL simulation 
investigated the concept of limited delegation of separation assurance to the aircraft for 
crossing and passing in en-route airspace, and sequencing in terminal areas [5]. Qualitative 
evaluations gathered from pilots and controllers indicated the feedback for the proposed 
method to be “promising with great potential”. However, when applied under certain 
conditions, the method resulted in increased workload and communication requirements 
for both pilots and controllers.  
Other HITL simulations have studied airborne spacing for arrival traffic [6]. Results 
showed a significant reduction in the variance of inter-arrival spacing at the metering fix. 
The overall feedback from controllers was positive with eye-fixations and analysis showing 
positive impact on controller activity in terms of relief from late vectoring. Other HITL 
studies have evaluated the CDTI assisted visual separation (CAVS) concept where the 
CDTI is used to maintain situational awareness when out-the-window visual contact with 
a target aircraft is temporarily lost. The ‘traffic to follow’ is designated by the ANSP and 
the cockpit crew use the CDTI and their own judgements to achieve self-determined 
spacing [7], [8]. The concept was found to be technically and operationally feasible based 
on the feedback from pilots and controllers in the HITL studies. However, to conduct these 
operations, means would have to be found to enable pilots to fly their wake mitigation 
techniques of choice while still complying with the airline’s requirement to fly stabilized 
approaches.  
Further, time based airborne merging/spacing operations on FMS arrival routes 
have also been evaluated using HITL simulations [9] which indicate that airborne spacing 
improves accuracy and is feasible for FMS operations and mixed spacing equipage. Several 
studies have evaluated the Flight-Deck based en-route Merging and Spacing (FDMS) 
concept using HITL simulations [10][11][12]. Results indicate that FDMS reduces the 
number of controller-issued maneuvers, communications and workload. A limited 
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implementation of FDMS has been certified and is currently in use for United Parcel 
Service (UPS) revenue flights.  An HITL study at Eurocontrol examined controller activity 
with and without the allocation to the flight deck of merging and in-trail spacing functions 
[6]. This study found that the allocation of these functions to the flight deck not only 
reduced the number of communications that the controllers had to initiate to the aircraft – 
it also changed when these communications were made. When juxtaposed next to 
limitations of communications systems such as latency and drop-outs, these 
communication requirements may exceed what is feasible. 
Likewise, other HITL studies compared air-ground allocation of the separation 
assurance and spacing tasks.  For example, two HITL studies at NASA, one controller-
focused and one flight deck-focused, compared the effects of mixed-equipage in delegating 
separation functions to some aircraft [13].  Similarly, under the Advanced Air 
Transportation Technologies (AATT) program, a study at NASA Ames investigated the 
performance of Distributed Air Ground Traffic Management (DAG-TM) [14]. Two 
competing en-route concept elements examined delegating the separation assurance task 
to the flight deck or leaving it on the ground with trajectory based operations. Initial results 
showed a benefit of moving some functions to the air in terms of flight efficiency, notably 
flight time. Similar results were found by NLR in an HITL study, part of the European 
INTENT project [15]. This project investigated the level of intent information requirements 
due to a different allocation but also found differences in terms of airspace capacity.  These 
studies represented substantial research efforts that simultaneously examined both different 
allocations and how automation and algorithm design (e.g., the conflict detection look-
ahead) might vary with different allocations. A flight test of an A340 in Reykjavic ATC 
south sector investigated the in-trail procedure through an operational evaluation [16]. The 
results show both operational and technical feasibility and show benefits in terms of 
reduced fuel burn and emissions. 
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Concepts involving automation of spacing functions have also been investigated. 
HITL simulations of the airborne self-spacing concept have been studied with positive 
evaluations from pilots and controllers [14] [17]. Results indicate that it is possible to 
conduct continuous descent arrivals in high-density airspace. Operational evaluations have 
also been performed to investigate highly automated spacing tools [18][19]. The results 
were positive with pass-behind and merge-behind maneuvers being successfully repeated. 
2.1.2 Separation Assurance and Spacing with Mixed Air-Ground Responsibility 
In contrast to air-ground control with the ANSP delegating functions to the flight 
crew on a limited number of cases, there have been studies on concepts where some aircraft 
are under ground-based control whereas others have limited or continuous delegation for 
separation assurance and/or spacing. HITL simulations have been performed to investigate 
the concept feasibility of shared air-ground separation responsibility [20][21][22]. Results 
indicate that, while safety was not compromised, pilots and controllers tended to have 
differing opinions about the operational suitability of the proposed concept. While the 
pilots found the concept generally favorable, controllers reported higher workload and 
expressed safety concerns, which was demonstrated by their cancellations of the delegation 
of authority to the aircraft. Controllers also preferred to resolve conflicts earlier and tended 
to cancel delegation of authority when they perceived pilots were delaying the conflict 
resolution. The authors recommended more research to define optimal roles for flight crews 
and controllers in separation assurance. 
HITL simulations of an integrated air/ground system in arrival sectors and terminal 
airspace have also been conducted [23][24][25]. While the pilots deemed the concept to be 
acceptable, controllers raised several safety concerns which mostly pertained to the 
occurrence of near-term conflicts between autonomous and managed aircraft. These results 
showed that mixed operations might be feasible in the same airspace if the unequipped 
aircraft count is held to a workable level; this level will decrease with increasing 
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complexity of the airspace, implying that an integrated airspace configuration is feasible 
up to a limit. 
2.1.3 Ground-Based Separation Assurance and Spacing 
In ground-based control, the ANSP predicts conflicts and sends resolution 
clearances to cockpit crew for execution. A key feature of future ground-based separation 
assurance concepts is trajectory exchange via datalink. Clearances are delivered using the 
Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC). Procedures for sending 
automation-generated trajectories to cockpit FMS for execution have been demonstrated 
on a Boeing 737 Level-D flight simulator hardware [26]. HITL and computer based 
evaluations have shown that the ground-based automation can accommodate high-altitude 
en route traffic with a very high rate of conflict resolution [27][28]. 
Concepts that automate more functions have been described in the Automated 
Airspace Concept (AAC) [29] where a ground based component, the Advanced Airspace 
Computer System (AACS), generates trajectories and directly sends them to the aircraft 
via datalink. Another ground-based component, the Tactical Separation Assisted Flight 
Environment (TSAFE), would provide safety in the event of failures in the AACS or on-
board systems. Computer based analyses have been conducted to evaluate the AACS 
[30][31]. Results state that, if the automation were to fail, the collision rate during the 
subsequent airspace evacuation would be under 1 per million hours.  
Many issues were identified with off-nominal short-term conflict detection and 
resolution. An operational evaluation of Boeing 777 demonstrated datalink-enabled 
conflict free continuous descent approaches into San Francisco International Airport [32]. 
The automation was able to predict meter-fix arrival times to within a mean accuracy of 3 
seconds over a 25-minute prediction horizon. While these studies establish the performance 
of automation in providing separation assurance, there is a need for evaluations under high-
density traffic in arrival sectors with and without metering constraints.  
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2.1.4 Airborne Separation Assurance and Spacing 
Several HITL studies have been performed to investigate the impact of the Airborne 
Separation Assurance System (ASAS) [11][33]. Results showed that pilot workload 
remained well within tolerable limits and pilots positively accepted ASAS. However, an 
operational evaluation in the vicinity of the Frankfurt International airport concluded that, 
for flight under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), it is not possible to replace the visual scan with 
the use of a traffic presentation onboard as it introduces new risks [34]. 
More complex airborne automation has been tested for situations involving short-
notice conflicts, highly constrained operations due to Special Use Airspace (SUA) or 
weather, transitions to/from free-flight airspace, lack of intent information, 
uncertainties/delays in data, and pilot delays in interaction with the ASAS. Several HITL 
studies have been performed with evaluation goals including intent information [35], near-
term conflicts [36], strategic vs tactical resolutions provided by automation [37], priority 
flight rules to maintain safety in potentially hazardous situations [38] and transitions 
between Managed and Free Flight Airspace [39]. In general, the results were positive and 
appeared to be well accepted by the participating pilots. 
More recently, computer-based Monte-Carlo simulation experiments have been 
performed to assess and quantify the safety behavior of airborne separation [40][41][42]. 
The consensus reached by these studies seems to be that ASAS can be very effective in 
low density en route airspace. However, off-nominal scenarios, especially in high density 
airspace, had substantial safety concerns. The results indicated a potential for clogging of 
conflicts i.e. simultaneous conflict situations occur and then such a cluster of conflicts tends 
to grow faster in size than the conflict resolution can handle. Further, the clogging of 
conflicts is an emergent behavior that is difficult to observe and analyze with established 
approaches. 
The literature review found two HITL simulations specifically designed to formally 
compare traffic operations with ground-based and airborne separation assurance. [43] 
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conducted a pair of coordinated simulations to gain insight on the comparability of the two 
function allocations for separation assurance. No substantial differences in performance or 
operator acceptability were found but certain conflict situations were detected too late to 
be resolved in a timely manner. [44] performed HITL simulations to evaluate pilot 
performance, workload and situational awareness under concepts of operation that differed 
with the allocation of separation responsibility across human pilots to ATC. The findings 
suggested that keeping pilots engaged in separation assurance tasks may be preferable to 
having them rely on automation alone. 
2.1.5 Summary of Air-Ground Allocations to Date 
It has been recommended in the literature [4] that more studies objectively evaluate 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of proposed operational concepts with varying air-
ground function allocations. Some studies have analyzed the allocation of interval 
management between air and ground, particularly in HITL simulations [45]. A 
computational study of tactical conflict resolution in an en-route free flight environment 
similarly assessed the impact of varying the ‘locus of control’ in conflict detection and 
resolution functions from being solely allocated to the ground controller to an increasing 
proportion of the aircraft (up to 100%) [46]. While the results were specific to conflict 
detection and resolution, this study emphasized the benefits of computational modeling as 
a cost and time-effective form of analysis, and modeled the actions as being completed the 
same by all the agents so that any observed effects could be isolated to the function 
allocation without confounds. Similar computational studies have demonstrated the impact 
of allocating functions between air and ground in arrival merging and spacing operations 
in terms of taskload, information transfer requirements and monitoring [47][48][49][50]. 
Thus, for the purpose of analyzing air-ground allocations, computational simulation 
appears to have promise.  
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2.2 Human-Automation Function Allocation 
The literature reflects a wide range of opinions on human-automation function 
allocation. In fact, whether human-automation function allocation should be considered 
science, engineering or a black art has been debated [51][52]. There are three main 
perspectives for the human-automation function allocation problem: 1) the man vs. 
machine capabilities perspective, 2) the team perspective, and 3) the work perspective. The 
following sections first describe these three perspectives and subsequently describe the 
overarching requirements and metrics for modeling and measuring human-automation 
function allocation.  
2.2.1 The Man vs. Machine Capabilities Perspective 
The most common perspective on allocating functions to humans and automation 
recommends the comparison strategy that compares each function to the individual 
capabilities of all the agents and assigns it to the most capable [53]. Such a strategy is 
fostered by the Fitts list, which proposes capabilities that men are good at versus those that 
machines are good at [54].  
Implicit to function allocation focused on the machine’s capabilities is the leftover 
allocation strategy [53]: Automate as many functions as technology will permit, and let the 
human pick up the rest. This allocation strategy has given rise to categorizing allocation 
using levels of automation [55][56]. However, with the focus on automation, the allocation 
of functions to the humans has often been haphazard and ill-suited to the capabilities of the 
human, leading to situations where, at one extreme, the human has consistently overridden 
automation and, at the other extreme, has been required to act as an unthinking actuator for 
an automation that alerts or suggests decisions [57][58]. Likewise, this strategy makes for 
brittle automation that can fail in an unexpected manner or provides little support in off-
nominal conditions, which is generally when automated support for the human operator is 
needed the most [59]. 
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To avoid situations where automation is put outside its boundary conditions, the 
role of the human in the leftover allocation strategy often involves a significant amount 
monitoring in addition to performing the left over functions: either monitoring the 
automation or monitoring the conditions or both [60][61]. However, consistent findings 
have shown that humans are not effective at being monitors [62][63]. This further creates 
concerns with low task engagement leading to vigilance and boredom issues that ultimately 
can culminate in the human being ‘out of the loop’ [60][64]. 
Literature supporting the leftover allocation strategy has noted the capability of 
automation to reduce average workload of human operators, often by reducing the manual 
control or execution functions that the humans must perform. This has been touted as a 
contribution of automation and, in aviation, has led to reduced staffing requirements 
including reduction of the number of flight crew members in the flight deck from three to 
two. However, there have been many incidents where automation has created workload 
spikes for a human team member [55][60][65]. For example, highly automated autoflight 
systems can suddenly require significant programming from the human flight crew in 
response to commanded reroutes by ATC, while the flight crew must simultaneously 
respond to the controller and in addition, potentially execute other tasks such as finding 
charts for the new route. 
2.2.2 The Team Perspective 
The allocation of taskwork functions within any team creates the need for additional 
teamwork functions that go toward coordination of the taskwork. These include the 
coordination of taskwork timing so that the team activities can be synchronized after a 
period of taskwork activities in parallel. In the context of human-automation function 
allocation, a team perspective includes considering the automation as a team member 
[66][67][68][69][70]. When automation is viewed as a team member, human-automation 
interaction becomes crucial. However, too often automation is clumsy: unduly interrupting 
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its human team members because unlike humans, automation cannot implicitly sense 
information about whether other team members would benefit from an interruption [71]. 
Therefore, predefined sets of function allocations may serve as more explicit coordination 
strategies in the case of human-automated teams, such as the function allocations that the 
pilot of a current day aircraft may invoke, or the playbook metaphor proposed by [72]. 
Authority and responsibility do not always need to be aligned. Authority-
responsibility mismatches, as first identified by Woods, occur whenever one agent is 
authorized to execute a task, but a different agent is responsible for the outcome [69]. As a 
result of the mismatch, the responsible agent needs to get information about the task 
outcome (and perhaps performance), monitor the authorized agent, and perhaps intervene.  
Thus, when the allocation generates authority-responsibility mismatches, it also implicitly 
creates additional information transfer and monitoring-taskload beyond that visible when 
only the authority allocation is examined. 
2.2.3 The Work Perspective 
Work is an ongoing response to, and action upon, the work environment. The 
physical environment has dynamics that drive the taskwork and at the same time, teamwork 
modifies the environment of agents, creating a dynamic interplay. For example, when the 
pilot is flying via the control column while the auto throttle is on, the pilot controls the 
elevator and the auto throttle controls the throttle setting. However, pitch and speed are 
intrinsically coupled leading to, for example, the pilot having to compensate for a change 
in pitch due to a change in speed made by the auto throttle. Thus, dynamic analysis is 
required to identify situations where interleaving of functions results in significant 
coordination requirements between agents, idling as one agent waits on another, or when 
one agent may be interrupting another. In aviation, function execution is dictated by 
established procedures which serve as an intrinsic dynamic within the work environment 
and mirror their structures, thereby guaranteeing consistency and safety [73]. Therefore, 
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function allocation should support how the dynamics of the work environment are managed 
by the agents. 
Further, in a coherent allocation, many functions naturally go together in terms of 
the information they act upon and the actions they take.  Thus, they can benefit from the 
same information sources and, when conducted together by the same agent, can be timed 
and executed synergistically: this would form a coherent allocation. Conversely, incoherent 
function allocations can require different agents to interleave their activities, each waiting 
upon the other, to perform related actions. 
2.3 Requirements and Metrics for Human-Automation Allocations 
The construct of function allocation is not simple and the problem of designing 
teams remains an unsolved challenge. Further, effective allocations cannot be simply 
created according to one design principle or objective. Instead, each allocation must 
simultaneously meet the following requirements [74]: 
Requirement 1: Each agent must be allocated functions that it is capable of performing.   
Requirement 2: Each agent must be capable of performing its collective set of functions. 
Requirement 3: The function allocation must be realizable with reasonable teamwork. 
Requirement 4: The function allocation must support the dynamics of the work. 
Requirement 5: The function allocation should be the result of deliberate design decisions. 
[75] and [76] identified several metrics to evaluate function allocations relative to 
these requirements. These metrics may be identified from detailed models of work, from 
computational fast-time simulations, and from assessments in simulated or actual 
operations.  
The collective taskwork of a team spans the actions required to achieve work goals 
and the allocation of taskwork actions then creates the need for additional teamwork actions 
to coordinate between agents, the subject of Requirement 3. The metric for assessing the 
workload imposed upon the agent due to the taskwork and teamwork actions is taskload. 
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Further, a metric for assessing the coordination requirement imposed is information 
transfer. 
The collective set of taskwork and teamwork must be examined together within the 
model to evaluate Requirements 1 and 2. This includes assessing authority-responsibility 
mismatches as another possible metric for function allocations for requirement 3. Likewise, 
to address requirement 4, function allocations can be assessed using the metric of 
coherence. 
Building on the aforementioned metrics, this thesis applies the metrics of taskload 
and information transfer, and examines a qualitative estimate of coherence. The total 
taskload demanded of an agent given a specific allocation is the sum total of taskwork 
contributing to mission performance, teamwork due to interaction with other agents, and 
teamwork due to monitoring demands. The resulting taskload on every agent due to 
performing the actions is important so that workload spikes or longer durations of workload 
saturation can be identified. Workload is a variable that indicates the relationship between 
the crude measure of taskload and the capability of the agent executing the actions [77]. 
Moreover, concerns with vigilance, complacency, and low engagement can be assessed 
using the metric of taskload. Note that the taskload can be an emergent construct created 
by the evolving demands on the team, and thus its extent can only be predicted through 
some form of simulation. 
Information transfer captures the teamwork aspect of the work required to be 
performed to meet the goals of the concept of operation. Different allocations will also 
establish different requirements for information transfer within a concept of operations, 
particularly in systems such as airspace that involve mixed-initiative systems and 
substantial contributions by human operators.  At one extreme, if only one agent can 
perform all the work, then s/he/it never needs to transfer information to, and receive 
information from, others because it ‘owns’ all the information in the system.  An allocation 
divides up the taskwork between agents, and the resulting need to coordinate activities 
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creates the need for information transfer. Whereas concerns with efficient communication 
require information transfer to be as low as possible, safety demands that more information 
be exchanged to foster redundancy and error checking. When information transfer will be 
required, and how often, is also an emergent construct in that it arises in response to the 
evolving dynamics of the operation to a degree that cannot be predicted with confidence a 
priori. 
2.4 Summary 
In the light of increasing advances in the novelty and the complexity of aviation 
concepts of operations, the air-ground allocation literature has called for more studies to 
systematically evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of proposed operational 
concepts with varying air-ground function allocation. Thus, there is a need to develop 
methodologies that can analyze the impact of allocating authority and responsibility for 
functions in aviation concepts of operation.  
Further, as there is little to no literature dealing with the synthesis of air-ground 
function allocation, the design of these allocations still largely remains a subjective process 
devoid of systematic mapping of allocations to the performance and safety goals of 
concepts of operations. Therefore, methodologies that can capture these system level goals 
and use them to synthesize allocations of authority and responsibility are needed by the air-
ground function allocation community.   
The requirements and metrics identified from the literature can inform the 
methodologies for the analysis and synthesis of air-ground allocations. These 
methodologies could the allocation of authority and responsibility in two different ways 
for analysis and synthesis, and subsequently use metrics to assess the impact of a given 




CHAPTER 3 -  ANALYZING ALLOCATIONS OF AUTHORITY 
AND RESPONSIBILITY 
This chapter proposes a methodology for the quantitative analysis of allocations of 
authority and responsibility in novel concepts of operation using computational modeling 
and simulation. Such simulation has the advantage over current-day subjective analysis by 
subject matter experts (SMEs) in that it can look for effects that are hard to predict for 
several reasons.  First, if the concept of operations is truly innovative and transformative, 
the expertise of SMEs will not extrapolate well to its new characteristics and concerns.  
Second, air traffic systems are complex by any measure, and thus benefit from 
computational methods that scale to their scope and detail.  Third, many of the interesting 
effects – and metrics – are emergent, i.e., they arise at a different level of abstraction than 
the behavior that creates them.  
The analysis of the impact of allocations of authority consists of two stages, 
documented next. First, the work of the concept of operations is modeled separately from 
the agent models. Second, the authority and responsibility for the work is allocated to the 
agent models during the run time of the simulation to assess metrics of the allocation.  
3.1 General Methodology for Analyzing Allocations of Authority 
This general methodology assesses metrics of a proposed allocation of authority 
and responsibility relative to the performance and safety goals of the concept of operations. 
Its goal is to guide designers of concepts of operations in their decision making concerning 
the allocation of authority and responsibility. Toward this goal, the assessment of metrics 
is intended to be a fast process such that the analysis time between proposal and assessment 




Figure 3.1: General methodology for analysis of allocations 
  
Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the methodology in terms of its inputs and outputs. 
The inputs are the prototype allocations of authority and responsibility to be analyzed, and 
a model of the concept of operations. This model can represent the concept of operations 
at any level of detail as appropriate to the stage of design. For example, as detailed in the 
next section, this thesis demonstrates early-in-design analysis where broad function 
allocation decisions are being made. Therefore, this thesis models the concept of operations 
as a mid-level model of the actions required of the concept of operations. The action models 
are deemed sufficient if they represent their successful completion, rather than emulating 
in detail how a specific agent or technology would perform them. However, were this 
methodology to be applied in later phases of the concept of operations design process, more 
detailed representations of the actions can be included in the model. In this way, the 
assessment of the allocation of authority and responsibility can be refined as the specific 
phase of design warrants. 
Similarly, for the early-in-design analysis examined in this thesis, the agents are 
modeled using base agent models that need only be capable of receiving an action to 
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execute and of calling the method modeling its activity. In early analysis of concepts of 
operation, use of the base agent model has a significant benefit: because each action is 
executed the same way regardless of the agent performing it, any differences in resulting 
system-level metrics are due to the allocation itself. Subsequent design phases could apply 
progressively detailed performance models for the agents.  
 
Figure 3.2: Mid-level model and emergence 
 
These inputs are passed into a simulation engine that then outputs metrics. Within 
the simulation runs, some aspects of system performance emerge “up”, such as traffic flows 
that can be assessed for their stability and consistent, high-throughput spacing.  Other 
metrics emerge “down” when they examine the specific demands on, and needs of, each 
agent, as shown in Figure 3.2. For example, the designer of a concept of operations may 
know a priori that the concept of operations assigns each pilot the action of calculating and 
commanding an airspeed that maintains a given spacing within an arrival stream; it takes 
simulation of several interacting aircraft, however, to systematically identify when (and 
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how often) each pilot will need to adjust airspeed, with associated metrics of the task load 
placed on each pilot and what information the pilots will need (and when). 
Out of the many possible metrics that can be captured, the system level goals of the 
concept of operations should govern the specific metrics that should be obtained from the 
simulation to assess the impact of allocating authority and responsibility. The case study 
later in this chapter uses the metrics of taskload, and information transfer requirements.  
Off-nominal events should start being examined early as well, particularly for 
foreseeable events that the concept of operations should be capable of handling.  This 
implies thinking through, and capturing in a model, the actions expected in responding to 
these events.  These actions may be added progressively such that, as soon as the first 
analysis verifies that the nominal operations do indeed proceed as planned, then an 
expanded range of off-nominal events (and increasingly detailed representations of their 
actions) can be examined. 
The analysis methodology described in this section can serve two purposes. First, 
it informs the designer about emergent features of the concept of operation and the 
behaviors that arise within it, informing further refinements to the design. Second, to the 
degree that the metrics predict the performance of the concept of operations, they allow 
comparisons between various proposed allocations of authority and responsibility. 
3.2 Modeling and Simulating Concepts of Operation  
This section details the two stages of analyzing allocations: 1) modeling the concept 
of operations, and 2) simulating the model to extract metrics to assess the allocation.  
3.2.1 Mid-Level Model of the Concept of Operations 
This thesis demonstrates the utility of a mid-level model of concepts of operation, 
particularly for early-in-design analysis. A mid-level model emulates the performance 
specification for each action without attempting to describe the specific mechanisms any 
one particular agent would employ or more detailed factors affecting how it achieves the 
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performance specification. For example, a mid-level model would consider the action 
“maintain commanded spacing” according to an idealized 2nd order model with a given 
damping and natural frequency. The input to this black box would be the state of the leader 
aircraft and the output would be a value for the airspeed that the trailing aircraft should set. 
This type of mid-level model is thus not specific to any particular agent and thus the metrics 
isolate design issues with the concept of operation itself without confounds due to possible 
issues in the performance of the actions. 
In contrast, a detailed-level model would use an actual algorithm that takes into 
account factors such as the noise in the state of the leader aircraft and the latency in 
communication between the aircraft, and would also need to model those factors. Such 
detailed modeling would typically be agent specific and thus would be more appropriate 
once the allocations are fairly well established.  
The mid-level model builds on what is known (or determined) early in the design 
of concepts of operation: the physics of flight, and the specifications for the actions that 
will be carried out. The physics of flight may be considered here as a constraint on what a 
concept of operations may expect of agents.  Fortunately, the basic physical principles are 
fairly well known early in design, and a range of aircraft dynamic models is available (from 
simple point-mass models to full non-linear six degree of freedom).  Performance 
differences between aircraft have also been extensively modeled such that aircraft dynamic 
models can be adjusted to represent a mix of aircraft types [78].   
Reasonable emulations of autoflight systems also exist [79].  Where new control 
behaviors might be needed by the concept of operations, during the early phases of design 
and analysis they are often better emulated by mid-level models that represent their desired 
inputs and outputs.  For example, in the case study presented later in this chapter, the 
calculation of airspeed to maintain an interval in a flow of aircraft does not need to account 
noisy, unreliable information and is emulated with a simple Proportional-Derivative (PD) 
regulator; while this emulation may be considered simplistic relative to a final design, at 
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early stages of design it allows for comparison of different function allocations using an 
algorithm common to all agents. 
Next, the design of a concept of operation specifies its actions.  Here, an action is 
defined as an activity that is executed at a single point(s) in time by a single agent.  Models 
of these actions identify their impact on the state of the air traffic system and/or changes 
they make in the timing of subsequent actions, and identify the conditions where each 
action needs to be carried out.  At the most basic level, some actions are needed to define 
the trajectory of the aircraft for the autopilot/autoflight to track by defining waypoints and 
required/scheduled times of arrival and/or by defining more immediate steering commands 
for speed, heading, vertical speed and altitude, etc.  Some of these actions also relate 
trajectory to the aircraft configuration, e.g. extend flaps as speed is reduced during the 
arrival.   
The state of the world is captured by models of resources, with the specific values 
cast as appropriate to any of a wide range of data types.  Actions are explicitly linked to 
resources via get and set relationships.  With this representation, computational models of 
actions are specifically defined as containing a method defining which resources the action 
gets, the calculations it makes based on knowledge of the resource values, the resulting 
output that it sets in resources to update some aspect of the state of the world, and any other 
actions that they request be scheduled immediately.  For example, in the case study 
described later in this chapter, the action “Command OPD Speed” gets the resources 
“Altitude” and “Distance to runway” and sets the resource “Commanded Airspeed”. 
Models of actions must also provide a method by which they declare the time they 
should next be scheduled to execute.  This structure allows for simultaneous execution of 
heterogeneous model types with significantly varying bandwidth.  For example, the actions 
updating the aircraft dynamic state have a sufficiently-small timestep that they approximate 
continuous dynamics (e.g., 0.01 seconds), the action “Calculate IM Airspeed” may need to 
iterate every second, and the “Start Descent” action need only be called once for each 
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aircraft.  This method of timing – only executing each action model when necessary – has 
two significant benefits: first, it is computationally efficient, and second, it ensures that the 
modeler of each action can define update rates representative of the action’s dynamics 
without being constrained by mechanisms such as simulation-wide synchronous updates at 
small time steps [80]. 
The actions and resources inherent to a concept of operation collectively comprise 
work models that are instantiated outside of the agent models: during run-time, the 
authority to execute an action, and the responsibility for that action, can be fluidly assigned 
to any agent at that instant, such that a range of function allocations can quickly be tested 
by varying the script or algorithm driving the allocation.  Multiple copies of work models 
can be instantiated at the same time; for example, in the case study that follows later in the 
chapter, three copies of the work models create a set of identical actions and resources for 
each aircraft that are then initialized and parameterized according to that aircraft’s 
particular configuration. 
Within this framework, then, the base agent models need only be capable of 
receiving an action to execute and of calling the method modeling its activity.  More 
advanced agent models are available that can add some aspects of agent dynamics to the 
simulation, such as delaying or interrupting actions according to a model of task 
management under workload constraints [81]. However, in early analysis of concepts of 
operation, such as the comparisons of multiple different allocations of responsibility and 
authority being examined in this thesis, the base agent model has a significant benefit: 
because each action is executed the same way regardless of the agent performing it, any 




3.2.2 The Work Models that Compute Simulation Framework 
Work Models That Compute (WMC) is a fast-time computational simulation tool 
written in C++ that can dynamically simulate the model of concepts of operation detailed 
in the previous section [82]. A simulation run is conducted by starting the simulation with 
reference to a script that indicates which work models to instantiate, and their initial 
conditions, to represent a desired concept of operations.  This script can also create 
exogenous events to be triggered at any point during the simulation to initiate off-nominal 
events or reconfigure some aspect of the concept of operation. 
Then, the simulation progresses by maintaining a list of the actions, sorted 
according to their desired next update time.  The action at the top of the list is examined 
and the global simulation clock set to its update time.  This action is then passed to the 
agent allocated with authority for its execution, who commands its method representing its 
activity.  Once this is completed, the action declares its next update time and is sorted back 
into the list accordingly.  The simulation then checks whether any termination criteria have 
been reached and, if not, proceeds to execute the next action. 
To specifically allow for quick evaluation of different function allocations, some 
further extensions were added in this thesis to the simulation framework.  First, during run-
time, when an action is given to an agent to execute based on its authority allocation, its 
responsibility allocation is also checked.  If a different agent has responsibility for the 
action, a monitoring action is automatically created and scheduled immediately after the 
current action.  Authority and responsibility for this monitoring action are given to the 
agent responsible for the current action.  This mechanism negates the need to explicitly 
develop and include all monitoring actions inherent to all function allocations to be 
analyzed: instead, the monitoring requirements emerge as the simulation progresses, and 
are automatically logged. 
Likewise, a metric of emergent behavior of interest is the extent to which a function 
allocation will require information transfer between agents.  For the purposes of large 
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numbers of computational simulations comparing multiple allocations of authority and 
responsibility, this is assessed automatically: when one action tries to get a resource value, 
the simulation compares this action with the action that set that resource value. If these two 
actions are different, then it is logged as an instance where information would need to be 
transferred between the two actions. Further, if the agents that have been allocated authority 
for executing these actions are different, then this represents an instance where the activity 
of one agent results in information that would need to be transferred to another agent. 
Finally, another metric assessed automatically by the computational simulation is 
the workload or taskload imposed upon each agent. Whenever an agent executes an action, 
the workload imposed by that action is added to the running tally of that particular agent’s 
workload. The case study described next assumes that, at the early stage of design, the 
workload imposed by each action is not yet quantified: instead, every action imposes a unit 
taskload on the agent executing it and so these simulations assess the simpler metric of 
taskload, i.e. the number of action instances they are called to execute. More detailed design 
stages might choose to model actions as each imposing differing amounts of workload 
depending on their complexity and the capabilities of the agent executing them. 
3.3 Case Study 
This section demonstrates the methodology described in the previous section in a 
case study of merging and spacing operations in aircraft arrival. This case study examines 
three aircraft on arrival into runway 18R at Schiphol airport via two merging arrival routes. 
Figure 3.3 shows the arrival route for Runway 18R into Schiphol airport. Aircraft 1 arrives 
from the west on RIVER 2B transition and aircraft 2 and 3 arrive from the east on ARTIP 
2C transition with aircraft 2 leading aircraft 3.  
The aircraft enter the airspace along trajectories created for Optimal Profile Descent 
(OPD) but, as necessary to space the aircraft such that they ultimately cross the runway 
threshold with the proper wake vortex spacing, they are sequenced onto merging arrival 
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paths and interval management (IM) is applied when a “following” aircraft must adjust its 
speed behind its “lead” aircraft for proper spacing. The aircraft configuration (in terms of 
flaps, speedbrake, and landing gear) is also managed to assist with the energy management 
of the aircraft and to ensure the aircraft was properly configured for management.  
In the nominal scenario, aircraft 1 (arriving from the west) performs OPD until EH 
608. It then merges into the final approach fix between aircraft 2 and 3 and performs IM 
in-trail behind aircraft 2. Aircraft 2 performs OPD throughout the approach. Aircraft 3 
performs IM in-trail behind aircraft 2 until aircraft 1 merges into the final approach fix 
after which aircraft 3 switches to IM with aircraft 1 as its leader aircraft. The altitude and 
airspeed profiles of the three aircraft are presented in Figure 3.4.  
 
  






Figure 3.4: Altitude and airspeed profiles for the three aircraft arriving into 
Schiphol airport RWY 18R 
 
This case study also investigates an off-nominal event. The off-nominal event 
examines the situation where one aircraft needs priority, and thus the traffic sequence may 
need to be re-adjusted, including stretching others’ paths to let the priority aircraft go first. 
The off-nominal operations are illustrated in Figure 3.5 where aircraft 1 (arriving from the 
west) requires priority to land first at RWY 18R and therefore aircraft 2 and 3 perform a 
fanning maneuver starting at the NARIX waypoint and rejoin the stipulated trajectory at 
EH 608 so that they can slot behind aircraft 1 in the arrival queue, contrasted with the initial 





Figure 3.5: Arrival routes for the three aircraft in the off-nominal scenario. Aircraft 
1 requests priority landing leading to aircraft 2 and 3 fanning off of the stipulated 
trajectory 
 
3.3.1 Actions, Agents and Allocations 
Table 3.1 summarizes the actions associated with the merging and spacing concept 
of operation in this case study. The actions are grouped into “functional blocks” where the 
actions in each block generally operate on the same information towards some shared 
objective or outcome. The designation of these blocks was based on the notions of control 
versus management, and the dimensions of lateral, vertical and speed, as well as 
configuring the aircraft and invoking actions suitable for managing off-nominal situations. 






Table 3.1: Actions involved in the case study 
Functional blocks Action name Action description 
Vertical profile 
control 
Start descent  
When clearance is given, configure the 
autoflight system to establish a 2 degree 
descent. Triggered by “Clear for Descent” 
Intercept GS 
Intercept glideslope signal and initiate 3 
degree glideslope descent.  Sets its next 
update time to when GS intercept is 
predicted. 
Land aircraft 
Land the aircraft (removes aircraft from 
simulation). Sets its next update time to when 
the aircraft is predicted to land. 
Vertical profile 
management 
Clear for descent 
Give clearance once aircraft reaches 
calculated top-of-descent location for OPD   
Sets its next update time to when it next 
predicts needing to check whether top of 
descent has been reached.   
Clear for final 
approach 
Give clearance to start final approach and 
intercept ILS signal.   Sets its next update 
time to when it next predicts needing to 
check whether aircraft is positioned for ILS 
intercept.   
Lateral control Direct to waypoint 
Configure the autoflight system to fly a 
heading direct to the target waypoint. 




Set the target waypoint.   Sets its next update 
time to when it next predicts the target may 
be reached or need to be changed. 
Execute path stretch 
Configure the autoflight system to execute a 
commanded path stretch.   Triggered by 
“Command path stretch.” 
Speed control Set airspeed 
Enter commanded airspeed into the autoflight 
system (during both OPD and IM)   
Triggered by actions setting commanded 
speeds. 
Speed 
management Command OPD speed 
Command an airspeed for OPD appropriate 
to altitude.   Declares its next update time to 
when it next predicts will reach flight level 
corresponding to a lower OPD airspeed. 
 Command IM airspeed 
Calculate the required airspeed to maintain 
the interval. (Any IM algorithm can be 
applied)   Sets its next update time to when it 
predicts needing to change the airspeed by 
more than 1 knot to maintain the commanded 




Next, the relevant agents can be identified as appropriate for each stage of the 
analysis.  Early in design, the agents may be defined using fairly coarse divisions.  For 
example, this case study just looks at the Air (“A”) and the Ground (“G”) agents, where 
the “A” agent is an aggregation of the three flight crews corresponding to the three aircraft 
in the case study. Later, more-detailed analysis may further detail both agents, such that 
the single “A” agent is replaced by multiple agents representing the pilot flying, the pilot 
managing, the autoflight system, and any other relevant automated systems, and similarly 
the “G” is replaced by agents representing both the “R” and “D” side controllers and any 




Set flaps and 
speedbrakes 
Command flaps and speedbrakes when 
needed.  Sets its next update time to when it 
predicts needing to check that the aircraft has 
slowed down to an airspeed that corresponds 
to a different flap and speedbrake setting. 
 Deploy gear 
Deploy gear when below 2,000 ft.  Sets its 
next update time to be when it predicts 




Command path stretch 
Calculate and command a trombone or 
fanning maneuver to create path stretch 
sufficient to create desired spacing.  Sets its 
next update time to when it predicts a path 
stretch may be required. 
 Determine sequence at merge point 
Determine the aircraft sequence at the merge 
point, including where IM will be required 
and whether a path stretch is required.   For 3 
aircraft case study, executed once according 
to script. 
 Set lead aircraft Set the lead aircraft for IM.  Triggered by “Determine Sequence” 
Aircraft dynamics 
(always executed 
by a separate 
flight agent) 
Fly aircraft 
Updates aircraft state using a non-linear 6 
degree of freedom aircraft dynamic 
simulation and autoflight’s determination of 
control surface deflections and throttle to 
track commanded trajectory.  Declares its 
next update time to be every 0.01s. 
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represents the aircraft physics and calls to be updated at 100 Hz is allocated to a separate 
“Physics” agent.  
The sheer scope of the design space, and the number of metrics that simulation can 
assess within each potential concept of operation, also demands some intermediate 
characterizations of likely good and bad designs. This case study characterizes potential 
allocations of authority and responsibility by their coherence.  This qualitative construct 
examines whether the actions allocated to each agent contribute to the same intermediate 
objectives and operate on the same set of information.  A coherent allocation, then, can be 
described in terms of the objectives that the set of actions allocated to any agent collectively 
achieve, where some of the actions create information that other actions then act on without 
needing to communicate between agents.  In contrast, an incoherent allocation requires 
different agents to inter-leave their actions, requiring extensive coordination and 
information transfer between them.  For example, when turning an aircraft on a ‘fanning 
maneuver’ extending its path so that it can be sequenced behind another aircraft, having 
one agent estimate and command an appropriate turn, and then another agent actually 
execute it, may leave the first agent needing to check the progression of the maneuver and 
to revise the commanded turn, and then the second agent performing the revised maneuver. 
Once the agents are defined, then potential allocations can be designed for both 
authority and responsibility.  Here, the construct of coherence can serve as an organizing 
principle. Using the aggregated functional blocks listed in Table 3.1 as inherently coherent 
groupings of actions, Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 describe the five coherent function 








Table 3.2: Authority allocations (A=Air, G=Ground) 
Functional blocks 
Authority allocations 
1 2 3 4 5 
Vertical profile control G A A A A 
Aircraft configuration management G A A A A 
Lateral control G A A A A 
Speed control G G A A A 
Lateral profile management G G G A A 
Vertical profile management G G G G A 
Speed management G G G G A 
Off-nominal situation management G G G G A 
 
Table 3.3: Responsibility allocations (A=Air, G=Ground) 
Functional blocks 
Responsibility allocations 
1 2 3 4 5 
Vertical profile control G A A A A 
Aircraft configuration 
management G A A A A 
Lateral control G A A A A 
Speed control G G A A A 
Lateral profile management G G G A A 
Vertical profile management G G G G A 
Speed management G G G G A 
Off-nominal situation management G G G G A 
 
In contrast, Table 3.4 illustrates an incoherent allocation. Within each of its 
functional blocks, authority for the actions is distributed so that the agents’ actions are 
inter-leaved.  For example, the Ground agent is allocated authority for “Calculate distance 
to runway”; the Air agent needs to wait for this information to be calculated and transmitted 
to it before it can execute “Start descent” and subsequently “Intercept GS”.  Similar 
divisions are made in the other functional blocks.  Further, the allocation of authority and 
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responsibility is set to maximum redundancy – an authority-responsibility mis-match is 
purposefully created for each action, whereby execution of any action by one agent must 
be monitored by the other. 
Table 3.4: Incoherent allocations (A=Air, G=Ground) 
Functional 
blocks Actions Authority Responsibility 
Vertical profile 
control 
Calculate distance to runway G A 
Start descent A G 
Intercept GS A G 




Set flaps and speedbrakes A G 
Deploy gear A G 
Lateral control Direct to waypoint G A Calculate distance to waypoint A G 
Speed control Set airspeed G A 
Lateral profile 
management 
Manage waypoint A G 
Execute path stretch A G 
Vertical profile 
management 
Clear for descent A G 
Clear for final approach G A 
Speed 
management 
Command OPD speed A G 




Command path stretch G A 
Calculate distance to merge point G A 
Determine sequence at merge 
point A G 
Assign lead aircraft G A 
 
3.3.2 Experiment Design 
Altogether, 52 simulations were conducted.  The first 50 simulations spanned all 
combinations of the five allocations of authority (Table 3.2), five allocations of 
responsibility (Table 3.3), and two different scenarios representing nominal and off-
nominal conditions.  The last two simulations examined the incoherent allocation (Table 
3.4) in both nominal and off-nominal conditions. In the nominal case, the aircraft were 
sequenced from the merging arrival routes onto the final approach path according to a 
simple algorithm based on each aircraft’s expect time of arrival over the point where the 
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arrival routes merged, and then the traffic flow continued according to this sequence.  In 
the off-nominal case, as noted before, this sequence was disrupted by one aircraft being 
given priority and placed first in the sequence, even as this required the aircraft behind to 
“fan” out their route to arrive later over the merge point. 
Throughout, the simulation logged the metrics of taskload and information transfer. 
It also logged detailed measures of system performance, including the trajectories flown 
by each aircraft (defining their efficiency and delay), and measures of aircraft spacing in-
trail in flight and arrival time at the runway.  In this case study, all the actions were 
performed perfectly regardless of the allocation of authority and responsibility, and thus 
the system performance did not vary between allocations. 
3.3.3 Results 
The simulation logged detailed metrics of the emergent demands on the agents 
themselves in terms of the taskload imposed on them and their information requirements. 
Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 show the taskload, i.e., the number of actions the Air and Ground 
agents have to perform, respectively, given the off-nominal event. These actions are of two 
types: (1) the primary authority actions defining the taskwork inherent to the concept of 
operations, with their authority allocated directly to the agent; and (2) the monitoring 
actions created in response to an authority-responsibility mismatch. 
Examining the impact of allocating primary authority for the actions inherent to the 
concept of operations, shown in grey in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7, the number of actions 
required across all the agents is a constant (note, some types of actions need to be executed 
multiple times, and each instance is counted here).  Thus, the primary allocation of 
authority aspects of these two figures are duals of each other, representing a simple division 





Figure 3.6: Total number of action instances performed by the three Air agents with 
varying authority and responsibility allocations 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Total number of action instances performed by the Ground agent with 
varying authority and responsibility allocations 
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The number of actions required by the set of agents is instead only increased by the 
need for monitoring due to mismatches between authority and responsibility. Here, the 
extremal cases are when the aircraft are allocated authority for all actions, and the ground 
agent is allocated responsibility for all the actions’ outcomes, or vice versa: assuming that 
the monitoring actions are conducted as frequently as the primary actions, the number of 
monitoring actions added by the allocation of authority and responsibility can equal the 
number of primary actions themselves. 
Another emergent demand at the agent level is the information required by each 
agent when each action needs to be executed.  As noted earlier, the simulator automatically 
flags any time an agent’s action needs to get a resource value that is set by another agent’s 
action, requiring some form of information transfer between agents.  Examining the impact 
of coherently allocating authority for the actions inherent to the concept of operations, 
shown in grey in Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9, the information transfer required for their 
execution is the greatest in the middle allocation of authority, i.e., when the work is spread 
equally over the agents. 
Monitoring due to a mismatch between authority and responsibility also 
significantly increases the need for information transfer, as shown in the clear columns in 
Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9.  These results are more notional because they are predicated on 
how the monitoring is conducted: they assume one information transfer per monitoring 
action, and assume that the monitoring occurs with the same frequency as the primary 
action that is being monitored.  With these assumptions, the information transfers required 
for monitoring can be significantly more than for the primary authority actions. For 
example, authority allocation 1 and responsibility allocation 5 in Figure 3.8 represents a 
case where the Air agent is responsible for all the actions but does not have authority for 
any of them. This, the Air agent needs to monitor the Ground agent. However, the Ground 
agent sets all the resources that it may need to get to perform its primary authority taskload 
whereas the Air agent does not set any of the resources that it needs to get to perform 
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monitoring. From an information transfer perspective, this results in the Air agent requiring 
monitoring information transfer that is higher than the primary information transfer 
required by the Air agent in some of the other allocations.  
 
 
Figure 3.8: Information transfer requirements summed over the three Air agents 





Figure 3.9: Information transfer requirements for the Ground agent with varying 
authority and responsibility allocations 
 
The incoherent allocation also significantly increases the need for information 
transfers.  As shown earlier in Table 3.4, this allocation requires information transfers both 
for the same coordination between functional blocks (as in the coherent allocations), and 
uniquely also between actions that are inter-leaved within the functional blocks.  These 
results flag conditions that themselves would merit further investigation.  For example, the 
inter-leaved actions (such as one agent calculating the distance to a waypoint as the basis 
for another to identify the trajectory to that waypoint) may need to be performed in quick 
succession to be accurate: this would make them particularly sensitive to latency or delay 
in their communication between agents.  Thus, while this computational experiment 
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assumed all information was transferred instantly, it also highlights cases where it may be 
particularly important to test this assumption. 
Finally, while Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7, Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9 provide aggregate 
assessments, their underlying data is also available for detailed analysis of each concept of 
operation.  For example, Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 illustrate when each aircraft agent 
had to execute actions throughout a simulated flight with authority allocation 2 and 
responsibility allocation 4, with both the off-nominal event and only nominal conditions 
respectively (the detailed action trace further records which actions were performed at each 
time, and which triggered others).  Many of these actions also required information 
transfer, which can also be itemized by time and event.  Examining first the Air agents’ 
actions with the off-nominal event as shown in Figure 3.11, different patterns of activity 
are visible between aircraft: aircraft 1 was given priority to land first and served as the lead 
aircraft which was able to follow an OPD trajectory down to final approach intercept and 
landing at around time 660s; the following aircraft, on the other hand, soon needed to re-
sequence themselves and fan out their arrival route to delay their time of arrival over the 
merge point, which changed their distribution of actions.  Likewise, the Air agents have 
significant monitoring with this allocation of responsibility: for aircraft 1 this monitoring 
is distributed through time, while for aircraft 2 and 3 this monitoring clusters around those 
periods in time where the IM requires the aircraft to reduce their speed. 
Likewise, the impact of the off-nominal event can be observed by comparing Figure 
3.11 and Figure 3.12.  Most notably, the aircraft land in a different order.  To do so in 
nominal conditions requires aircraft 1 to perform several actions as it establishes the correct 
interval behind aircraft 2 (mostly monitoring actions with this allocation of authority and 
responsibility).  In contrast, in the off-nominal event, aircraft 2 instead needed to perform 




Finally, the simulation also allows analysis of the ground agent’s actions and their 
timing.  With the allocation of authority and responsibility shown in Figure 3.10, the 
Ground agent is given mostly primary allocation of authority for actions inherent to the 
concept of operations, with the Air agents allocated the responsibility that generates 
monitoring.  Thus, the Ground agent’s taskload is primarily centered on speed control and 
lateral profile management tasks that contain some frequently occurring actions. These 
actions need to be completed for each of the three Air agents, which results in a large 
amount of actions for the Ground agent. 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Trace of actions performed by the Ground agent 
 

















Figure 3.12: Trace of actions performed by the three Air agents in the off-nominal 
scenario 











































This chapter described a methodology to model concepts of operation according to 
the actions that define them and subsequently test allocations of authority and 
responsibility between agents in simulation. Using the methodology proposed in this 
chapter, analysts can predict and compare the system-level performance and agent-level 
requirements associated with different concepts. The methodology was demonstrated in a 
case study for the early-in-design allocation of authority and responsibility. 
This chapter examined both the allocation of authority and of responsibility. The 
allocation of authority determines which agent will execute each action, and thus is the 
most directly observable; further, it generally drives what system-level behaviors and 
performance will emerge within the operation.  This chapter further demonstrated the 
importance of also examining the allocation of responsibility for the outcome of each 
action.  A full understanding of the agents’ collective work needs to also account for the 
monitoring required when different agents have authority and responsibility for the same 
action; the case study here identified allocations where such monitoring can add 
significantly to both the taskload on specific agents, and their requirements for information 
transfer from other agents. 
While the specific demands on the agents were predicted using simulation, the 
general trends in the results were predicted by the qualitative attribute of the coherence of 
the allocation.  A coherent allocation assigns actions such that each agent is performing all 
the actions that contribute to the same general function using the same information, while 
an incoherent allocation breaks up these functions across agents such that they have to 
inter-leave their actions and to frequently transfer back-and-forth the intermediary 
information used within the functions.  Thus, the coherence of allocations may serve as a 
quick qualitative guiding principle for defining potential allocations.  
Once potential function allocations are defined qualitatively, this chapter 
demonstrated how they can be systematically and computationally analyzed early in 
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design.  This chapter represented concepts of operation building on what is known early in 
their design (the constraints due to the physics of flight and the mid-level models of the 
actions required), and on what can be specified early in their potential allocations of 
authority and responsibility. This representation allows for the simulation of concepts of 
operation before more detailed design aspects are known (such as specific algorithms 
underlying various technologies).  Thus, the “work” of the concept of operations is not yet 
tied to any one agent, and the authority and responsibility for actions can be fluidly assigned 
– at any time during the simulation – to simulate a wide range of allocations.   
However, while the methodology described in this chapter can be used for 
analyzing allocations, it cannot be used to synthesize allocations, especially as the design 
process progresses to more detailed stages. Thus, if the metrics obtained from the 
simulation indicate poor performance or safety (or both), under all the allocations that have 
been tested, the designer of the concept of operations needs a methodology to generate a 
new set of candidate allocations that can satisfy the performance and safety goals of the 
concept of operations. The current day processes of generating these candidate allocations 
are largely based on heuristics and trial and error. To formalize and streamline this process, 
the next chapter proposes a methodology for the systematic synthesis of allocations of 




CHAPTER 4 -  SYNTHESIZING ALLOCATIONS OF AUTHORITY 
AND RESPONSIBILITY 
This chapter proposes a methodology for the synthesis of allocations of authority 
in concepts of operations. The concepts of operations are assumed to be subject to 
externally specified allocations of responsibility, thereby reducing the scope of the 
methodology to generating only allocations of authority. This chapter proposes that 
properties inherent to the work of the concept of operations can be captured by modeling 
it as a network of actions.   
The synthesis of allocations of authority consists of three stages. First, the concept 
of operations is modeled as a network of actions connected through getting and setting of 
resources. This network is enriched by the spawning of monitoring actions, reflecting the 
impact of authority-responsibility mismatches. Second, the synthesis of authority 
allocation is treated as an optimal network-partitioning problem where actions are clustered 
together in terms of authority allocation. The objective functions and constraints of this 
optimization problem are posed such that they reflect the goals of the concept of operation 
both from the standpoint of system performance and safety. Third, the allocation of 
authority of actions to agents is derived from the clusters obtained.  
The following sections first describe a general methodology by which allocations 
of authority can be synthesized systematically, second review fundamental network theory 
to support the modeling the concept of operations as a network of actions, and finally 
demonstrate the methodology in a case study. 
4.1 General Methodology for Synthesizing Allocations of Authority 
This general methodology systematically synthesizes allocations of authority that 
achieve the performance and safety goals of the concept of operations. The synthesis of 
authority allocations is posed as a network optimization problem where objective functions 
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and constraints reflect the performance and safety goals for the concepts of operations 
being designed. 
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the general methodology in terms of its inputs and 
outputs. The inputs are the objective functions and constraints that reflect the performance 
and safety goals of the concept of operations, the allocation of responsibility, and a network 
model of the concept of operations. As detailed in the subsequent section, this network 
model is framed in terms of the actions constituting the concept of operations where the 
actions are connected by getting and setting of resources. Further, the network is 
parametrized using the metrics obtained from the analysis methodology demonstrated in 
the previous chapter.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: General methodology for synthesis of allocations 
 
These inputs are passed into an optimization solver that identifies clusters in the 
network of actions that optimize attributes of the network model. Thus, the objective 
functions and constraints, while reflecting the performance and safety goals of the concept 
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of operations, also need to be framed in terms of measurable attributes of the network 
model of the concept of operations. For example, the case study described later in this 
chapter achieves this using the metrics of taskload weighting the nodes of the network and 
information transfer weighting the edges of the network. The solver also reports the 
optimum values of the objective function and the associated values of the constraints. 
The obtained clusters of actions can then guide the allocation of authority for 
clusters to agents. Depending on the scenario, agents can be allocated authority for multiple 
clusters of actions. Some agents may be allocated authority for more clusters as compared 
to other agents depending on the individual workload and capacities of the agents, or the 
information requirement of the agents. For example, the distribution of authority to control 
airspace sectors between just one air traffic controller versus two controllers is a function 
of how busy the traffic flows are on that particular day.  
4.2 Network Representation of Concepts of Operation 
In the context of designing allocations of authority for concepts of operation, the 
metrics that quantify the performance and safety of concepts of operations are generally 
emergent in that they are observed at a different level from that which is modeled. Since 
emergent features arise from inter-element interactions, a model of the concept of operation 
that can expose the structure and attributes of these interactions is the first step toward 
designing authority allocations. This section proposes a network representation of concept 
of operations that is used to first formulate, and second solve, the problem of allocating 
authority given external responsibility allocations. The subsequent sub-sections firstly 
define the terms from network theory and then model the concept of operations as a 
network of actions. 
4.2.1 Network Theory: Mathematical Preliminaries 
Graphs provide natural abstractions for how information is shared between agents 
in a network [83][84]. These abstractions contain virtually no information about what 
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exactly is shared by the agents, through what protocols the exchange takes place, or what 
is subsequently done with the received information. Instead, the graph-based abstraction 
contains high-level descriptions of the network topology in terms of objects referred to as 
nodes and edges. Of particular importance is algebraic graph theory that provides the tools 
to analyze the combinatorial characteristics of networks (represented by graphs) within a 
dynamic system (an air traffic concepts of operations). This sub-section establishes the core 
definitions used in network theory that will be subsequently used in this chapter. 
The concepts of the vertex set and edges define graphs. A graph is built upon a 
finite set referred to as the vertex set and denoted by V. Each element of V is a vertex (or 
node) of the graph. For a graph with n nodes, the vertex set is represented as: 
𝑉𝑉 = {𝑣𝑣1, 𝑣𝑣2, 𝑣𝑣3, … , 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛}. 
  
Edges are defined on the 2-element subsets of the vertex set, denoted as [V] 2. This 
set consists of elements of the form {vi,vj} where i,j = 1,2,…,n with i ~= j. The set of edges 
of the graph is a particular subset of [V] 2. The graph G is formally defined as the pair: 
𝐺𝐺 = (𝑉𝑉,𝐸𝐸). 
 
where V is a finite set of vertices and E is a particular subset of [V] 2. 
The graph is said to be weighted when the edges are assigned weights. The weights 
are defined by the function 
𝑤𝑤:𝐸𝐸 → ℝ. 
 
Graphs can be visually represented by dots (the vertices vi) and lines between vi and 
vj when vivj belongs to E. Figure 4.2 shows a dot-edge representation of a network with 8 




Figure 4.2: Graphical representation of networks 
 
The adjacency matrix A(G) is the symmetric nxn encoding of the adjacency 
relationships in the graph G 
[𝐴𝐴(𝐺𝐺)]𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗  𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 𝐸𝐸 
 
A cluster C is a subset of the vertex set V = [n]. A partition of the graph is then a 
grouping of its vertex set into different clusters. Figure 4.3 shows a network partitioned 
into 3 clusters. Once a network is partitioned, the edges of the network can be distinguished 





Figure 4.3: Graph partitioning to form clusters in a network 
  
The problem of graph partitioning (GP) has been a subject of much study because 
of its applications in a wide variety of domains, such as the distribution of work to 
processors of a parallel machine [85]. GP is extensively used to ensure load balancing and 
to minimize communications across processors. Physical design of digital circuits for very 
large-scale integration (VLSI) heavily uses GP [86]. In computer vision, the goal of image 
segmentation is to partition the pixels of an image into groups that correspond to objects 
and GP has become one of the most important solution techniques for this problem [87]. 
Complex networks, i.e., weighted graphs created by real-life or modeling processes 
[88], have introduced numerous applications of GP to identify groups of similar nodes in 
the networks and also identify connected components. Minimizing the impact of cascading 
events in power grids [89], detection of biological processes by finding clusters of involved 
nodes in biological networks [90] and finding community structure in social networks [91] 
all heavily rely on the detection of partitions within the graph representation of the 
underlying system.     
Many techniques and algorithms have been developed to solve the graph 
partitioning problem. Spectral partitioning uses spectral properties of the graph to find the 
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optimal partition of the graph [92][93][94]. Many methods have been developed that rely 
on the branch-and-bound framework [95]. The max-flow min-cut theorem has also been 
used to separate node sets in a graph [96]. In recent years, evolutionary methods employing 
a number of metaheuristics have also been applied to solve the GP problem [97].  
4.2.2 Forming a Network of Actions to Represent a Concept of Operations 
 In the models of concepts of operations described in Chapter 3, actions interact 
with the environment by getting and setting resources. Thus, actions interact with each 
other through resources that convey information about the state of the environment. This 
sub-section details how the interaction between actions can be represented as a network, 
which can then be used to guide the allocation of authority for actions.  
When an action gets a resource that has been set by another action, an edge is 
formed between the action that set the resource and the action that got the resource. 
Throughout the application of simulations (as demonstrated in chapter 3), this edge can be 
weighted by the number of times this interaction happened, representing information 
transfer between the actions. For example, in Figure 4.4, w1 equals the total number of 
times that Action1 set Resource1 that was then gotten by Action2. 
 
 




Further, note that the graph representing the connection between actions is a 
multigraph, i.e. there are multiple edges between two actions (because of there being 
multiple possible resources through which the actions interact). The multigraph nature of 
the action network can be further simplified by collapsing all the edges connecting two 
actions into a single edge that is weighted as the sum total of the weights of the original 
edges connecting the actions. Figure 4.5 shows the action pair Action1 and Action2 with a 
single edge that combines the edges connecting Action1 and Action2 as shown in Figure 
4.4.  
Further, Figure 4.5 also shows the weights on the actions themselves (n1 and n2). 
These node weights equal the number of actions instances, i.e. the number of times the 
action was executed during the course of the concept of operation. Thus, Action1 was 
executed n1 times and Action2 was executed n2 times. These weights on the nodes give an 
indication of the taskload imposed by the actions on the agent executing them. Thus, an 
action with a higher node weight represents a higher taskload on the executing agent as 
compared to an action with a lower node weight.   
 
 
Figure 4.5: Forming a weighted edge between actions 
 
The concept of operations in the case study described next involves the 25 actions 
listed earlier in Table 3.1. Figure 4.6 shows this network of actions with the edges weighted 
by the information transfer between actions as determined by the getting and setting of 





Figure 4.6: Network of primary authority actions 
 
Authority-responsibility mismatches enrich the network by adding monitoring 
actions and their associated edges to the network. Thus, there can be two types of actions 
in the network: primary authority actions and monitoring actions. For the purpose of 
network analysis and partitioning, these two types of actions have an important difference: 
while primary authority actions always need to be captured as nodes in the network 
regardless of the allocation, the existence of monitoring actions in the vertex set depends 
on the allocation of authority compared to the specified responsibility allocation. Thus, 
monitoring actions add to the notion of emergence in the system as they are only added to 
the network when the clustering of the primary authority actions creates an authority-
responsibility mismatch.  
Corresponding to the formation of nodes in the network (primary authority action 
nodes and monitoring action nodes), edges can also be of two types. When both the end 
nodes for an edge are primary authority actions, the edge is said to be a primary authority 
edge. When either of the actions is a monitoring action, formed due to the mismatch in the 
authority and responsibility allocation for the corresponding primary authority action, the 
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edge is said to be a monitoring edge. Figure 4.7 shows a situation where the authority 
allocation has led to a mismatch in the authority and the responsibility allocation for certain 
actions and thus has created monitoring actions. Circles represent primary authority actions 
and squares represent monitoring actions. Further, the monitoring edges are represented by 
dashed lines and the solid lines represent edges between two primary authority actions. 
Finally, the figure represents a case where the primary authority action network has been 
partitioned into two clusters shown by the red and green colors. The edges crossing the 
clusters are represented by heavier lines.  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Network showing two clusters (red cluster on the right and green cluster 
on the left). Circles represent primary authority actions and squares represent 
monitoring actions. Solid lines represent primary authority edges and dashed lines 
show monitoring edges. The heavier lines indicate edges crossing clusters 
 
While the unweighted network can be used for the preliminary design of authority 
allocations using the structure provided in terms of action linkages, weighting the network 
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of actions, both in terms of the edge weights and the node weights, can better parametrize 
the network to represent scenarios that the concept of operations would be applied in. This 
parametrization is made possible through the computational simulation demonstrated in 
the previous chapter. Note that the simulation only needs to be run once to capture the edge 
weights (representing information transfer between actions) and node weights 
(representing taskload associated with an action). The objectives and constraints of the 
network optimization problem to find clusters of actions in the network are then framed in 
terms of these network attributes that represent action-level metrics.  
Monitoring edges can be weighted in multiple ways depending on the type of 
monitoring being studied. In this thesis, the lower and upper bounds on monitoring activity 
are established by basic monitoring and complete monitoring, respectively. To represent 
basic monitoring, all the edges originating from, or culminating at, the monitoring action 
node are weighted as the number of times the monitoring action was executed in the 
simulation. This represents a basic monitoring strategy in that every time the primary 
authority action is executed, the monitoring action checks for a single indicator of the 
output’s goodness [50]. Complete monitoring, on the other hand, is represented by 
weighting the monitoring edges with exactly the same weight as the edges of the 
corresponding primary authority action that is to be monitored. This weighting represents 
the scenario where the monitoring action gets and sets the same number of resources as the 
primary authority action.  
4.3 Case Study 
The merging and spacing concept of operation studied in the previous chapter is 
now studied from the perspective of synthesizing allocations of authority under the same 
five responsibility allocations. This case study considers authority allocation to two 
clusters: the Air cluster and the Ground cluster.   
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All possible combinations of two objective functions, six constraints and five 
responsibility allocations result in a total of 60 different syntheses of authority allocations. 
Specifically, the objective functions considered here are: 1) minimize total information 
transfer across clusters and 2) maximize total information transfer across clusters. These 
objective functions are representative of real operation objectives. Operations that want to 
reduce the risk of disruption due to cyber-threats like hacking would require minimized 
information transfer between agents such that each agent possesses localized information 
to perform its own operations and the coordination variables needing to be passed between 
agents are as few as possible. On the other hand, if redundancy is critical for the concept 
of operations, it makes sense to maximize the information transfer between agents so that 
more than one agent knows about every action being executed and can step in to rectify 
errors and mistakes.  
The constraints are posed in terms of taskload associated with the clusters. When a 
cluster is allocated authority for an action, the taskload associated with that action gets 
imposed on that cluster. Thus, it is important to study the impact of authority on taskload 
imposed on clusters. The six constraints considered in this case study are as follows.  
1. No constraints: The synthesis of authority allocations is posed as an  
unconstrained optimization problem. This allows full freedom to the 
optimization algorithm to allocate actions to either of the clusters without any 
constraints on the resulting taskload. Thus, certain allocations may allocate the 
entire set of actions to one cluster leaving the other cluster with no actions at 
all. These allocations may be useful to establish the boundaries in terms of how 
severely skewed the allocations may be in terms of taskload on clusters. 
2. Balance primary authority taskload: This constraint requires the taskload due to 
primary authority actions on the Air cluster and the Ground cluster, to be equal. 
3. Balance monitoring taskload: This constraint enforces the taskload due to 
monitoring actions on the Air cluster and the Ground cluster, to be equal.  
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4. Balance total taskload: This constraint enforces the total taskload, i.e., the sum 
of primary authority and monitoring taskload Air cluster and the Ground cluster 
to be equal.  
5. Cap primary taskload on the Ground cluster: This constraint enforces an upper 
limit on the primary authority taskload that can be imposed on the Ground 
cluster, which is representative of scenarios where agents have a limit on their 
taskload capacity. 
6. Cap monitoring taskload on the Ground cluster: This constraint enforces an 
upper limit on the monitoring taskload that can be imposed on the Ground 
cluster, which is representative of scenarios where agents have a limit on their 
capacity to monitor. 
 
The external responsibility allocation is also specified for each action. The same 
five allocations of responsibility as studied in the previous chapter are presented and are 
numbered from 1 through 5 where 1 represents responsibility for the entire set of actions 
allocated to the Ground cluster and 5 represents the same for the Air cluster, as shown 
earlier in Table 3.3. Thus, authority-responsibility mismatches occur whenever the cluster 
with authority for that action and the cluster with responsibility for that action, respectively, 
are not equal. The optimization problem also has to account for such potential mismatches 
in authority and responsibility as it solves the authority allocation problem and has to 
determine which configuration of authority, with the associated spawning of monitoring 
actions according to the responsibility allocation, best achieves the goals of the concept of 
operations. 
The authority allocation problem is now formulated as an optimization problem 
which, in this case study, was solved via a Genetic Algorithm. The design variables are the 
authority allocation for every action. The authority allocation problem represents the 
optimum grouping of actions into clusters such that the objective function is optimized 
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while satisfying the constraints. The inter-cluster information transfer, the basis of the 
objective function of the optimization problem, is calculated using the weighted edges 
connecting actions that belong to different clusters. Similarly, the actions that belong to a 
cluster add their node weights to the taskload associated with the cluster due to an 
allocation of authority for primary authority actions, and due to monitoring actions 
reflecting authority-responsibility mismatches. These taskload values are used for checking 
whether the allocation is feasible relative to the taskload constraints.  
4.3.1 Results 
The optimization problem was studied with 60 combinations of objectives, 
constraints and responsibility allocations, resulting in 60 allocations of authority. For each 
authority allocation, the metrics of inter-cluster information transfer and taskload imposed 
on each cluster were captured. The following sub-sections split discussion of the results 
into two sections based on the two objective functions: minimizing versus maximizing 
inter-cluster information transfer.  
4.3.1.1 Minimizing Inter-Cluster Information Transfer 
Examining the authority allocations seeking to minimize inter-cluster information 
transfer, Figure 4.8 summarizes the information transfer between the Air and the Ground 
clusters for the 30 allocations generated by varying the 6 tasklaod constraints and the 5 
responsibility allocations. The information transfer between the clusters is categorized into 
two types: primary authority information transfer (shown in grey in the figure) represents 
information transfer due to actions having to get resources that have been set by other 
actions, and monitoring information transfer (shown as transparent bars) represents the 
information transfer due to monitoring requirements generated by authority-responsibility 
mismatches. 
Predictably, when no constraints are imposed on the possible taskload on the 
clusters, and responsibility for all actions is allocated entirely to either the Air cluster or 
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the Ground cluster, authority is allocated to the same cluster as is given responsibility to 
negate the need for information transfer for monitoring. This unconstrained allocation thus 
results in the need to transfer information neither for primary authority actions, nor for 
monitoring actions. 
Other taskload constraints result in allocations of authority requiring inter-cluster 
information transfer. For example, the constraint requiring primary authority taskload to 
be balanced across the air and ground clusters results in inter-cluster information transfer 
because, no matter what the responsibility allocation, both clusters have to transfer some 
information as each performs half the primary authority taskload. For this constraint, some 
allocations of responsibility can result in authority allocations requiring less information 
transfer where authority-responsibility mismatches, and commensurate monitoring, can be 
reduced. 
The constraint requiring total taskload to be balanced across the air and ground 
clusters results in higher inter-cluster information transfer. To satisfy this constraint, the 
authority allocation has to be such that the sum total of primary authority and monitoring 
taskload is equal across the two clusters. When the responsibility for all actions is allocated 
entirely to one cluster, the resulting authority allocation creates monitoring in one cluster 
mirroring primary authority allocations to the other cluster. On the other hand, for 
responsibility allocations distributed across the two clusters, more authority-responsibility 




Figure 4.8: Information transfer values obtained by minimizing inter-cluster 








Figure 4.9: Taskload imposed upon Ground cluster for minimizing inter-cluster 
information transfer with varying responsibility allocation and constraints 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Taskload imposed upon Air cluster for minimizing inter-cluster 
information transfer with varying responsibility allocation and constraints 
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Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 portray the total taskload imposed on the Ground and 
Air clusters, respectively, with the same authority allocations as in Figure 4.8. As with 
information transfer, the taskload imposed on the clusters is also categorized into two 
types: primary authority taskload (grey) and monitoring taskload (transparent). The 
taskload due to primary authority in the two figures represent observations that are duals 
of each other. For every authority allocation, summing up the primary authority taskloads 
on the Air and Ground clusters results in the same constant value as it represents the 
taskload associated with the work that is necessary for the concept of operations. Thus, 
while different authority allocations may divide up the primary authority taskload 
differently between the Air and the Ground cluster, the total primary authority taskload 
remains the same across all authority allocations. 
In the unconstrained taskload case, the three responsibility allocations giving the 
most responsibility to the Ground cluster result in an authority allocation that assigns 
authority for all the primary actions to the Ground cluster to minimize the inter-cluster 
information transfer requiring for monitoring in the face of authority-responsibility 
mismatches. Likewise, for responsibility allocations 4 and 5, the resulting authority 
allocation swaps to giving primary authority mostly to the Air cluster. 
In one of the constrained cases, the primary authority taskload on the Ground 
cluster was capped. The value of the cap was fixed at 850, which is the mean between the 
unconstrained taskload value and the balanced primary authority taskload value on the 
Ground cluster. Under this capping constraint, with the responsibility allocated entirely to 
the Ground cluster, the authority for all the actions can no longer just be assigned to the 
Ground cluster to minimize the information transfer. Hence, some actions are allocated to 
the Air cluster, resulting in monitoring taskload for the Ground cluster. Moreover, since 
the actions that could not be allocated to the Ground cluster are allocated to the Air cluster, 
there is an associated primary authority taskload on the Air cluster. On the other hand, with 
the responsibility allocated entirely to the Air cluster, authority for all the actions is 
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allocated to the Air cluster because the constraint does not impose any capping requirement 
on the primary authority taskload on the Air cluster.  
The constraint balancing primary taskload across the Ground and Air clusters 
results in even taskload across all responsibility allocations on the Ground cluster and 
progressively reduces monitoring for the Ground cluster as the responsibility for more 
actions is allocated to the Air cluster. On the other hand, the constraint balancing total 
taskload results in allocations of authority that are significantly different in behavior as 
they impose much more monitoring load on the Ground cluster as compared to the other 
constraint cases for the responsibility allocations that allocate responsibility for more 
actions to the Ground cluster. 
Table 4.1 reports the resulting allocations of authority for actions to the Air and 
Ground cluster obtained under the varying allocations of responsibility and constraints. 
Note that three copies of each action are listed, corresponding to each of the three aircraft 
in the scenario. In the unconstrained case, for the three responsibility allocations that 
allocate responsibility for more actions to the Ground cluster, the authority for the entire 
set of actions is allocated to the Ground agent. The two responsibility allocations that 
allocate responsibility for more actions to the Ground cluster allocate more actions to the 
Air cluster. 
The addition of taskload constraints causes the resulting allocations of authority to 
differ from the unconstrained case. For instance, imposing the constraint of balancing 
primary authority taskload no longer allows an authority allocation for all actions to either 
Air or Ground entirely, even when one cluster has responsibility for all actions. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the same type of action, for different aircraft, 
can be allocated to different clusters. For example, in the balance primary taskload 
constrained case with responsibility allocated entirely to the Ground cluster, the actions 
“Calculate Distance to Runway” for both aircraft 1 and 2 are allocated to the Ground 
cluster, whereas for aircraft 3 it is allocated to the Air cluster. This illustrates the 
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importance of the taskload imposed by actions as captured by the node weights in the 
network representation. Since aircraft 3 performs IM throughout the arrival approach, the 
“Calculate Distance to Runway” action is executed more often for aircraft 3. Thus, in this 
case, allocating the same type of action for different aircraft to different clusters facilitates 
the objective of minimizing information transfer under the constraint of balancing the 
resulting primary authority taskload on the clusters. 
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Table 4.1: Authority allocations for minimizing inter-cluster information transfer with varying constraints and responsibility 
allocations. (G=Ground cluster, A=Air Cluster) 








authority taskload on 
the Ground  Cluster 
Cap monitoring 
taskload on the 
Ground Cluster 
Actions\Resp 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
3manageWP G G G A A G G G A A G G G A A A G A A G G G G A A G G G A A 
3calcIM G G G G A G G G G A G G G G A A A A A G G G G G A G G G G A 
3setleadAC G G G G A G G G G A G G G G A G G G G A G G G G A G G G G A 
3interceptGS G G G A A G A A A A G G G A A G A A A A G A G A A G G G A A 
3setairspeed G G G G A G G G G A G A A G A A A A G G G G A G A G G G A A 
2calcdistRW G G G G A A A A A G G G G G A A A A A G A A G G A G G G G A 
3cleardescent G G G G A G G G G A G A G G A A A G G G G G G G A G G G A A 
2manageWP G G G A A G G G A A G G G G A A G A A G G G G A A G G G A A 
2cleardescent G G G A A A G G A G G G G A A G G A G G G G G G A G G G A A 
1manageWP G G G A A G G G A A G G G A A G G G A A G G G A A G G G A A 
1cleardescent G G G G A G A A G G G G A G A A G G G G G G G G A G G G G A 
3directWP G G G A A G G G G A G G A G A A G A A G G G A A A G G G A A 
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Table 4.1 continued: Authority allocations for minimizing inter-cluster information transfer with varying constraints and  
responsibility allocations. (G=Ground cluster, A=Air cluster)  
2directWP G G G A A G G G G A G A A G A A A A A G G A A A A G G G A A 
1directWP G G G A A A A A G G G A A G A A G A A G G G G A A G G G A A 
2interceptGS G G G A A A A G A A G A A A A G A A A G G G G A A G G G A A 
2commOPD G G G A A A G A G A G A G G A A G A G G G G G G A G G G G A 
2setairspeed G G G G A G G G G G G A A A A A A A G G G G A A A G G G A A 
1interceptGS G G G A A G A G A A G A A A A A A A A A G A G A A G G G A A 
1commOPD G G G G A G G A G G G G A A A G A A G A G G G A A G G G A A 
1setairspeed G G G G A G G G A A G G G G A G G G G A G G G A A G G G G A 
1calcdistRW G G G G A A A A A G G G G A A A A G G G G G G A A G G G G A 
3calcdistRW G G G G A G G G A G G G G G A A A G G A G G G G A G G G G A 
2setleadAC G G G G A G G G G G G G G G A G G G G A G G G G A G G G G A 
1setleadAC G G G G A G G G G A G G G G A G G G G A G G G G A G G G G A 
1calcIM G G G G A G G G G A G G G G A A A A A G G G A G A G G G G A 
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4.3.1.2 Maximize Inter-Cluster Information Transfer 
While the previous section discussed the resulting authority allocations for 
minimizing information exchange between the Air and the Ground clusters, this section 
studies the synthesis of authority allocations with the objective function of maximizing the 
information transfer between the two clusters. Such an objective may stem from the need 
for error checking and redundancy to increase the overall safety of the concept of 
operations where ‘shared situation awareness’ or cross-checking between the agents is 
important.  
Figure 4.11 summarizes the inter-cluster information transfer for the 30 allocations 
of authority resulting from the varying responsibility allocations and constraints. 
Predictably, the average information transfer across all 30 allocations is nearly triple that 
of the average information transfer obtained with the objective of minimization of 
information transfer.  
For the case when no taskload constraints are imposed, and responsibility for all 
actions is allocated entirely to either the Air cluster or the Ground cluster, the resulting 
allocations of authority result in monitoring information transfer because all the actions are 
allocated to the cluster that is not given responsibility to maximize the need for information 
transfer for monitoring. Interestingly, this unconstrained allocation results in no primary 
authority inter-cluster information transfer because it would have required sacrificing 
authority-responsibility mismatches, thereby reducing the possible inter-cluster monitoring 
information transfer.  
Other constraints result in allocations of authority that vary both the amount of 
monitoring and the amount of inter-cluster information transfer. For example, the 
constraint requiring capping the total monitoring on the Ground cluster results in the inter-
cluster information transfer being composed of both primary authority and monitoring 
components. In this constraint, the allowable monitoring taskload on the Ground cluster is 
capped at 550, which is the mean value between the unconstrained case and the balanced 
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monitoring case. Since the capping of allowable monitoring load on the Ground cluster 
prohibits maximizing authority-responsibility mismatches, and instead allocates authority 
for certain actions to the same cluster that has responsibility for them, the optimal allocation 
of authority (for those responsibility allocations that do not allocate responsibility entirely 
to the Air cluster), involves allocating authority to both the Air and the Ground clusters.  
The constraint requiring total taskload to be balanced across the Air and Ground 
clusters results in the same information transfer behavior as the unconstrained case. Since 
the monitoring behavior studied in this case study imposes the same taskload on the cluster 
as the corresponding primary authority action, this constraint treats the monitoring actions 
and primary authority actions as equivalent from the taskload perspective. Thus, the 
maximum inter-cluster information transfer under this constraint is found where 
responsibility allocation is allocated entirely to one cluster. When total taskload is required 
to be balanced across both clusters, and the responsibility for all actions is allocated entirely 
to one cluster, the resulting authority allocation simply allocates primary authority for all 
actions to the cluster without responsibility for any actions.  
Finally, whereas dividing up the authority allocation between two clusters is a 
possible way to increase the resulting inter-cluster information transfer, the figure shows 
that authority-responsibility mismatches also provide additional inter-cluster information 
transfer through monitoring requirements. Thus, a combination of dividing primary 
authority allocation between cluster to generate primary authority information transfer and 
authority-responsibility mismatches to generate commensurate monitoring information 
transfer can result in allocations of authority that enable the concept of operations to meet 






Figure 4.11: Information transfer obtained by maximizing inter-cluster information 






Figure 4.12: Taskload imposed upon the Ground cluster for maximizing inter-
cluster information transfer with varying responsibility allocation and constraints 
 
Figure 4.13: Taskload imposed upon the Air cluster for maximizing inter-cluster 
information transfer with varying responsibility allocation and constraints  
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 Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13 report the taskload imposed on the Air and Ground 
clusters with varying constraints and responsibility allocations. These figures show a 
marked difference in the taskload profiles of the allocations as compared to the profiles 
obtained with the objective of minimizing information transfer. Previously, the constraint 
that capped monitoring on Ground cluster to 550, with responsibility allocations that 
allocated the responsibility for majority of actions to the Ground cluster, resulted in the 
Ground cluster taking up the majority of the primary authority taskload and the Air cluster 
having very little taskload. In contrast, for the same responsibility allocations, these figures 
show the Ground cluster imposed with both more monitoring and primary authority 
taskload and the Air cluster imposed with more primary authority taskload.  
Similarly, again considering the responsibility allocations that allocate 
responsibility for the majority of actions to the Ground cluster, the unconstrained case 
differs from the minimize information transfer objective studied in the previous section. 
While previously the Ground cluster was allocated the entire primary authority taskload 
and the Air cluster had no taskload at all, the Air cluster is now imposed with the entire 
primary authority taskload and the Ground cluster is imposed with monitoring taskload 
resulting from the actions being allocated to clusters such that the entire set of actions has 
authority-responsibility mismatches. 
Overall, there is a higher total taskload created with maximal information transfer 
as compared to the case with the objective of minimizing information transfer. Since the 
total primary authority taskload has to be constant irrespective of authority allocation, 
constraints or responsibility allocation, the additional taskload can only arise from 
authority-responsibility mismatches. Thus, the overall higher taskload observed here is due 
to the monitoring taskload associated with authority-responsibility mismatches arising out 
of the allocations designed to maximize inter-cluster information transfer.  
 Table 4.2 reports the resulting allocations of authority obtained with the objective 
of maximizing inter-cluster information transfer under varying constraints and 
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responsibility allocations. The impact of the choice of objective function on the resulting 
authority allocations is evident from this table. The case with no constraints on taskload 
and responsibility for the entire set of actions allocated to the Ground cluster serves as an 
example to illustrate this point. Whereas previously the authority for all actions was 
allocated to the Ground cluster, now with the objective of maximizing inter-cluster 
information transfer, the authority for all the actions is allocated to the Air cluster to 
generate the most authority-responsibility mismatches.  
Overall, responsibility allocations that allocated more responsibility for more 
actions to the Air cluster result in the authority for more actions being allocated to the 
Ground cluster. Similarly, allocating responsibility for more actions to the Ground cluster 
results in authority for more actions being allocated to the Air cluster. This behavior is 
opposite to the allocations obtained with the objective of maximizing inter-cluster 
information transfer.   
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Table 4.2: Authority allocations for maximizing inter-cluster information transfer with varying constraints and responsibility 
allocations. (G=Ground cluster, A=Air Cluster) 








authority taskload on 
the Ground Cluster 
Cap monitoring 
taskload on the 
Ground cluster 
Actions\Resp 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
3manageWP A A A G G A A A G G G A A G A A A A G G A A A G G A A A G G 
3calcIM A A A A G A A A A G G G G A A A A A A G A A A A G A A A A G 
3setleadAC A A A A G A A A A G A A A A G A A A A G A A A A G A A A A G 
3interceptGS A A A G G A G A G G A A A G G A G A G G A A A G G A G A G G 
3setairspeed A A A A G G A G A G G A A A A A A A A G A A A G G A A G G G 
2calcdistRW A A A A G G G G G A G G G G A A A A A G A A A A A G G G G A 
3cleardescent A A A G G A A A A G G A A G G A A A A G A A A G G A A A G G 
2manageWP A A A G G A A A G G A A A G G A A A G G A A A G G A A A G G 
2cleardescent A A A A G A A A G G G A A G G A A A A G A A A A G A A A G G 
1manageWP A A A G G A A A G G A A A G G A A A G G A A A G G A A A G G 
1cleardescent A A A G G G A A G G G A A A A A G A G G A A A G G A A A A G 
3directWP A A A G G A A G G G G G A G A A A A G G A A A G G A G G G G 
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Table 4.2 continued: Authority allocations for maximizing inter-cluster information transfer with varying constraints and 
responsibility allocations. (G=Ground cluster, A=Air cluster)  
2directWP A A A G G A A A G A G G G G A A G A G G A A A G G G A A G G 
1directWP A A A G G A G A G G G A A G A A G A G G A A A G G G G G G G 
2interceptGS A A A G G A A A G G G A G G A A G A G G A A A G G A A A G G 
2commOPD A A A G G G A G G G G A G G A A G A G G A A A G G A A A G G 
2setairspeed A A A G G G A A G A G A G G A A G G A G A A A A G A A A A G 
1interceptGS A A A G G A G A G G G G G G G A G G G G A A A G G A A G G G 
1commOPD A A A G G G A A A G G A G G G A A G A G A A A G G A A G G G 
1setairspeed A A A G G A A A A G G A A G G A A G G G A A A G G A A G G G 
1calcdistRW A A A A G G G G A A G G G G A A A G A G A A A A G G G G A G 
3calcdistRW A A A A G G A A A G G A A A A A A A A G A A A A G A A A A G 
2setleadAC A A A A G G A A A G G A A A G A A A A G A A A A G A A A A G 
1setleadAC A A A A G A A A A G G A A A G A A A A G A A A A G A A A A G 




This chapter described and demonstrated a methodology for systematic synthesis 
of authority allocations to reflect the performance and safety goals of concepts of 
operations. The methodology first framed the concept of operations as a network formed 
by its constituent actions. Then, the design of the authority allocation was cast as a network 
optimization problem with the goal of finding optimal clusters in the network of actions. 
The objective function and constraints of the optimal clustering were selected to reflect the 
performance and safety goals of the concept of operations. 
The methodology was demonstrated in the case study of the previous chapter but 
now from the perspective of synthesizing allocations instead of analyzing them. The goal 
of the case study was to allocate authority for all actions to two clusters: Air and Ground. 
Two objective functions were studied: minimize inter-cluster information transfer and 
maximize inter-cluster information transfer. Five different allocations of responsibility 
were studied, ranging from responsibility for all actions allocated entirely to the Ground 
cluster to responsibility for all actions allocated to the Air cluster. Six different constraints 
were studied representing various requirements on the resulting taskload that could be 
imposed on the two clusters. 
The network model of the concept of operations was parametrized by weighting its 
nodes and edges to represent scenarios of interest. This parametrization was made possible 
by a single run of the computational simulation demonstrated in the previous chapter. The 
simulation was only needed to be run once to capture the edge weights (representing 
information transfer between actions) and node weights (representing taskload associated 
with an action). The optimization problem was then framed in terms of metrics derived 
from these attributes of the network.  
The optimization problem was solved in this case study using a Genetic Algorithm. 
The authority for the two clusters of actions could then be allocated to the Air and Ground 
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agents. The resulting information transfer and taskload on these agents was recorded. This 
distribution of authority of clusters to agents depended upon the specific responsibility 
allocation and taskload constraints imposed on the concept of operations. 
The resulting allocations of authority with associated metrics of inter-cluster 
information transfer and cluster taskload were found to vary significantly with the 
responsibility allocation and the different constraints on allowable taskload. Thus, the value 
of the methodology proposed here is reflected in its ability to quickly examine appropriate 
allocations of authority given required responsibility allocations, and to do so 
comparatively early in design, before the prototyping and detailed specification of training 
and procedures inherent to later-in-design testing methods. Further, since the objective 
functions and constraints were chosen to reflect the performance and safety goals of the 
concept of operations, the results indicate that there is no one optimum allocation of 
authority. Rather, the allocation of authority has to be guided by the performance and safety 




CHAPTER 5 -  CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Summary  
This thesis examined air traffic concepts of operations calling for novel allocations 
of authority and responsibility. Specifically, this thesis proposed and demonstrated 
systematic methodologies to analyze and synthesize these allocations. The allocation of 
authority determines which agent will execute each action, and thus is the most directly 
observable; further, it generally drives what system-level behaviors and performance will 
emerge within the operation. However, a full understanding of the agents’ collective work 
needs to also account for the monitoring required when different agents have authority and 
responsibility for the same action.  
This thesis first proposed a methodology to analyze allocations of authority and 
responsibility. The methodology represents concepts of operation building on what is 
known early in their design (the constraints due to the physics of flight and the mid-level 
models of the actions required), and on what can be specified early in their potential 
allocations of authority and responsibility.  This representation allows for the simulation 
of concepts of operation before more detailed design aspects are known (such as specific 
algorithms underlying various technologies).  Thus, the “work” of the concept of 
operations is not yet tied to any one agent, and the authority and responsibility for actions 
can be fluidly assigned – at any time during the simulation – to simulate a wide range of 
possible function allocations.  
While the specific demands on the agents can be predicted using simulation, the 
general trends in the results can also be predicted by the qualitative attribute of the 
coherence of the allocation.  Coherent allocations assign actions such that each agent 
performs actions that contribute to the same general function using the same information, 
while incoherent allocations require agents to inter-leave their actions and to frequently 
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transfer information back-and-forth. Thus, the coherence of allocations was identified as a 
construct to serve as a quick qualitative guiding principle for defining potential allocations.  
Next, this thesis proposed a methodology for the systematic synthesis of authority 
allocations to reflect the performance and safety goals of concepts of operations. The 
methodology first frames the concept of operations as a network formed by its constituent 
actions. The network model of the concept of operations is parametrized by weighting its 
nodes and edges to represent scenarios of interest. This parametrization is made possible 
by a single run of the computational simulation methodology for analyzing allocations to 
capture the edge weights (representing information transfer between actions) and node 
weights (representing taskload).  
The objective function and constraints of the optimal clustering are selected to 
reflect the performance and safety goals of the concept of operations framed in terms of 
metrics derived from attributes of the network. The optimization identifies clusters of 
actions in the network representation to subsequently guide the allocation of authority for 
actions to agents. 
Both the analysis and the synthesis methodologies were demonstrated in case 
studies involving merging and spacing operations of aircraft in arrival operations. The case 
studies showed that emergent metrics, such as taskload and information transfer, can be 
used to assess allocations of authority and responsibility in concepts of operations. Further, 
capturing these emergent metrics in a network representation allowed the synthesis of 
allocations to meet the performance and safety goals of the concept of operations. These 
goals were represented as objectives and constraints in the synthesis of allocations of 
authority.  
The resulting allocations of authority with associated metrics of inter-cluster 
information transfer and cluster taskload were found to vary significantly with the 
responsibility allocation and the different constraints on allowable taskload. Thus, the value 
of the methodology proposed here is reflected in its ability to quickly examine appropriate 
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allocations of authority given required responsibility allocations, and to do so 
comparatively early in design, before the prototyping and detailed specification of training 
and procedures inherent to later-in-design testing methods. Further, since the objective 
functions and constraints were chosen to reflect the performance and safety goals of the 
concept of operations, the results indicate that there is no one optimum allocation of 
authority. Rather, the allocation of authority has to be guided by the performance and safety 
goals of the concept of operations  
5.2 Contributions 
The first objective of this thesis was achieved by creating methodologies and tools 
for the analysis of allocations of authority and responsibility in the design of future ATM 
concepts of operations. The analysis of allocations extracts emergent metrics of taskload 
and information transfer using computational simulation. While this methodology can be 
applied at any stage of the design process by modeling the agents and actions to a level of 
detail commensurate with the design stage, this thesis showed how analysts can predict and 
compare, early in design, the system-level-performance and agent-level requirements 
associated with different proposed allocations of authority and responsibility. Further, the 
rapid re-configurability of the simulation framework makes the methodology amenable to 
what-if experiments to test out a range of constructs that can help designers conceive of 
new operations and estimate their performance. Likewise, while the simulations can 
replace SME estimates with more systematic predictions, the SMEs have the unique 
capability of then valuing these predictions, and flagging results that may be problematic 
(e.g., excessive task load or reliance on information transfer, assumptions about 
monitoring). 
The second objective of this thesis was achieved by demonstrating a methodology 
for the synthesis of allocations of authority. The synthesis problem is framed as a network 
optimization problem with the concept of operations modeled as a network of actions 
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which is then parametrized using the metrics obtained from simulation. This methodology 
can be used to synthesize allocations of authority for a wide range of concepts of operations 
as it allows the performance and safety goals of the concept of operations to be represented 
as objective functions and constraints in terms of the attributes of the network model. Thus, 
the value of the methodology proposed here is reflected in its ability to quickly identify 
appropriate allocations of authority given required responsibility allocations, and to do so 
comparatively early in design, before the prototyping and detailed specification of training 
and procedures inherent to later-in-design testing methods.  
5.3 Future Work 
The work reported in this thesis can be extended in several interesting directions. 
While this thesis demonstrated the proposed methodologies in case studies focusing on 
“early in design” analysis and synthesis, the methodologies can continue to contribute 
throughout the later design process. In the simulations used here, the actions were executed 
perfectly, identifying an upper bound on what is achievable within the concept of operation.  
However, once the fundamental framework of the concept of operation has been explored 
with perfect execution, the models of the actions can then emulate in detail how specific 
agents or technologies might actually execute them. This might define specific 
requirements for technologies, or might analyze the in situ performance of specific 
algorithms, communication structures, or procedures. The synthesis process could then 
take into account these specific requirements to refine allocations of authority.    
Such explorations can also help define the role of the human agents in air traffic 
concept of operations.  For example, assumptions for human intervention in off-nominal 
situations can be articulated, modeled and computationally simulated. Where effective 
courses of action are identified in the computational simulations, they can then be further 
codified into the specific procedures and training accompanying the concept of operation. 
Further, when the clusters of actions identified in the network representation of the concept 
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of operations are to be allocated to agents, the allocation could be guided by the identified 
roles of the human agents.  
Likewise, as noted earlier, related studies have incorporated key aspects of human 
performance into the agent models such that a simulated human agent might, under 
conditions of high task load, choose to delay or interrupt some of their assigned actions.  
Such effects can then impact system performance in potentially unpredictable ways; at an 
extreme, low-priority or long-delayed actions may be forgotten or otherwise overcome by 
events. 
It is important to also analyze the allocation of responsibility and its likely impact 
on human agents, particularly where their roles are more that of a “manager,” “supervisor” 
or “monitor.”  The results in the case studies in this thesis highlighted how frequently an 
authority-responsibility mismatch can implicitly demand additional monitoring actions of 
human agents, which themselves also can require significant information transfer.  
Subsequent studies could explore this monitoring further, seeking to explicitly articulate 
what this monitoring work really demands of the human.  For example, what information 
should the monitoring agent base the monitoring on, and how will this agent get this 
information?  Such questions would benefit from the designer specifying not only how the 
execution of the primary actions should be modeled, but also how they should be monitored 
(and how often), for inclusion in the analysis and synthesis process. 
Finally, the approach demonstrated in the case studies at the early-in-design stage 
might also continue to the later stages involving human-in-the-loop (HITL) testing. Such 
HITL testing can be expensive to develop and conduct. The computational simulations here 
can help in their development by exploring the range of conditions or design variables that 
merit HITL testing. Further, the models and simulations here, given their focus on 
examining the work of the agents in the concept of operations, aid in defining and 
describing the tasks that the humans will need to perform in the HITL. Likewise, the 
models and simulations of the broader concept of operations used here can also be 
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synchronized with real-time simulators so that a test with a single (real) human operator 
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